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ABSTRACT
“Delivering the Vote: The Political Effect of Free Mail Delivery in Early Twentieth Cen-
tury America(with Elisabeth Perlman)”, examines the effect of Rural Free Delivery on the
behavior of voters and elected officials. Using a panel dataset covering the years surround-
ing the roll-out of RFD, and a set of instrumental variables to address the endogenous
allocation of routes, we find that voters in communities receiving more routes vote more
frequently, spread their votes more widely across candidates, and vote for smaller parties.
Additionally, we find evidence of political shifts in elected officials, with representatives
voting more in line with rural communities.
“Duvergers Law and Strategic Voting: an Empirical Test Using Floridas Elimination of
Primary Runoff Elections”, provides evidence from an empirical test of Duvergers Law and
strategic voting, utilizing the 2001 decision by the state of Florida to eliminate runoffs in
primary elections. Using a differences-in-differences specification, I find that while changes
in voting behavior in Florida are consistent with predictions of Duvergers Law and models
of strategic voting, the measured effects are much smaller than findings in other settings.
I provide evidence that this may be due to low turnout in primary elections, which may
induce two-candidate equilibria in runoff elections.
“What We Talk About When We Talk About Campaign Spending” utilizes the 2012
American National Election Survey, which asked about voter intent before the election and
actual voting behavior after, and candidate disbursement data which allows me to track
candidate spending throughout the campaign, I can determine the effect of candidate
iv
spending on individual voting behavior. I find that spending by candidates on advertising
and campaign events increases the likelihood that voters will change their preferences in
favor of that candidate. I also find that using aggregate candidate spending to measure
the causal effect of incumbent and challenger spending could lead to biased estimates, and
could be driving previous results that have found incumbent spending to be less effective
than challenger spending.
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Chapter 1
Delivering the Vote: The Political Effect of Free
Mail Delivery in Early Twentieth Century
America(with Elisabeth Perlman)
1.1 Introduction
Changes to information flows affect the behavior of both the electorate and politicians;1
when deciding whether to vote and for whom to vote, coordinating with other voters, and
interacting with their elected officials, potential voters rely on information from candidates,
media sources and other potential voters. However, because information networks and
access to mass media are almost always endogenous to political activity, the ability for
researchers to identify quasi-experimental settings through which to measure the causal
effects of information on political outcomes is limited. However, Rural Free Delivery (RFD),
which introduced daily mail to millions of rural homes at the turn of the twentieth century,
provides us with a unique opportunity to explore this relationship.
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century there were great changes in
how information was acquired and disseminated in the United States. The invention of the
web rotary press made large-scale newspaper and magazine printing runs possible,2 and the
introduction of radio dramatically reduced the marginal cost of disseminating information.
The establishment of telegram and telephone lines across the country made interpersonal
1Almond and Verba wrote, in their seminal 1963 book, “The uneducated man or the man with limited
education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education.”
2Hamilton (2004) discusses how large scale print runs lead through the desire to attract a wider variety
of subscribers to the development of the independent newspaper.
2communication much more affordable. The potential for these changes to affect the political
process was manifold, particularly in the way that they changed the ability of individuals
to acquire information, and of political candidates and parties to send messages to voters.
These advancements were especially important for residents of rural areas, whose iso-
lation during post-Civil War America was an acute concern for policy makers.34 This
relative isolation was notably apparent in rural residents’ almost complete lack of access
to daily mail. Since 1864, city dwellers enjoyed either at-home mail delivery or close prox-
imity to post offices, while rural residents were forced to travel many miles to the nearest
post office to receive mail. These concerns led to a push for the expansion of daily mail
delivery to rural homes. First created on an experimental basis in 1896, and rolled out
across the country during the first decade of the twentieth century, RFD changed the flow
of information to rural communities as well as the information networks within them.
This paper explores the effect of RFD on the functioning of the political process. The
program dramatically changed both the frequency and the richness of information rural
communities could receive, providing us with a unique opportunity to measure the causal
effects of access to mass media and information networks. Any attempt to measure the
causal effect of voter information on political outcomes faces a severe endogeneity problem,
since people’s consumption of information is typically endogenous. People who consume
more information and groups with more robust information networks will vote in different
ways, elect representatives with different characteristics, and elicit different results from
these representatives due to a number of variables and characteristics, many of which
are unobserved. RFD, however, led to an almost immediate change in the availability of
information to individuals affected by the service. Because not every person received RFD,
and because eligibility for the service was determined by a complex set of rules established
3In his 1903 Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, President Theodore Roosevelt
said, “Rural free delivery, taken in connection with the telephone, the bicycle, and the trolley, accomplishes
much toward lessening the isolation of farm life and making it brighter and more attractive.”
4While in much of the world rural resistances tend to cluster there dwelling in small villages, rural area
in the US tend to be populated by evenly spaced isolated farm houses, where ones closet neighbor is often
more than a quarter mile away.
3by the United States Post Office, we can use a set of instruments to estimate the causal
effect of RFD on political activity.
Using this variation we find that one RFD route increases voter turnout, as well as
electoral competition within a county, measured through the number of parties receiving
5%, 10%, or 20% of the vote. This increase in competition appears to benefit small parties,
as the share of the vote going to neither the Republican nor Democratic party increases
with more RFD routes. Using a dataset on daily, semi-weekly and three times weekly
newspapers, we find that these observed effects for several of our results are stronger in
communities with newspapers, providing support to the hypothesis that RFD changed
voting behavior primarily by changing the level of information available to voters. We
also find a change in the behavior of elected officials in response to RFD allocation. The
policy position of members of the House of Representatives, based on their roll-call votes
on the floor of Congress, shifts towards stances that were, at the time, associated with
rural communities. In particular, we look at the contentious issues of temperance and
restricting immigration, and find that the support for both increases with RFD rollout. Of
these results, our findings of the effect of RFD on the distribution of votes are both the
most robust and the most surprising, in that these results are not predicted by existing
theoretical models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides additional details
on the motivations for this paper, while section 1.3 describes the historical context for the
rollout of RFD. Section 1.4 provides our results split into two parts—section 1.4.1 that
examines a fixed effect estimation and section 1.4.2 that examines a instrumental variables
estimation. Within these parts section 1.4.1.1 and section 1.4.2.1 discuss our data, the later
discuses the collection of the instrument, while section 1.4.1.2 and section 1.4.2.2 discuss
the results. The potential mechanisms for these results are explored in section 1.5, and
the changes to the behavior of elected officials is examined in section 1.5.1. Section 1.6
concludes.
41.2 Motivation
Rural Free Delivery, according to reports from both postal workers and recipients, led to
significant changes in three areas: in the amount of mail sent and received by communities,
in newspaper circulation, and in the quality of roads in RFD communities.
The 1902 Report of the Postmaster-General states that postal revenue for counties
receiving RFD increased by an average of ten percent. One major source of this increase
in mail volume was an increase in newspaper circulation. We can observe this using a
dataset of newspaper circulation based on Gentzkow et al. (2012) with our own additions
(see section 1.4.1.1).
Finally, the introduction of RFD in rural communities had the effect of improving
road quality in these communities. Passable roads were a requirement for RFD; rural road
construction and maintenance was largely in the hands of farmers. The Post Office required
that families along approved routes that traversed low-quality roads sign a pledge to work
to improve and maintain roads, or face losing the route.
Increased mail and better roads affected the bidirectional flow of information, while
higher newspaper circulation changed the dissemination of information across communities.
Each of these effects changed the structure of networks and information flows in rural
communities, and could in turn change the way in which voters reach their decisions, and
thus in turn their relationship with their Representatives.
Previous research can help us develop hypotheses for the possible effect of RFD on
political outcomes. Firstly, empirical studies have consistently found that higher levels of
connectivity and information lead to higher levels of voter turnout. Gentzkow et al. (2011),
using data on newspaper entry and exit, show that the entrance of the first newspaper in
a county is associated with a small but significant increase in voter turnout. Gerber et al.
(2009) conducting a field experiment, found that people were 30 percent more likely to
vote when researchers said they would tell the respondent’s neighbors whether or not they
voted. The theoretical motivation for these results lies in the groundbreaking work by
5Riker and Ordeshook in 1968, who introduced the theory of social motivation for voting.
Under this theory, even with small probability of being pivotal and relatively high costs to
voting, people will respond to senses of civic duty or goodwill. Stronger ties to groups or
neighbors could increase the social benefit to voting, therefore increasing turnout.
Voter turnout is not the only relevant margin. Because RFD did not affect all communi-
ties equally, an increase in turnout in those communities would also affect the distribution
of voters. Increased connectivity in rural communities could also affect the ability for rural
voters to coordinate their votes behind individual parties or candidates. Small parties,
including the Greenback and Populist parties, advocated for farmer-friendly policies, while
The Grange continued to be a strong unofficial political player. The ability of many of
these groups, which lacked centralized political machines, to reach rural voters may have
been minimal, and therefore would have benefited the most from RFD.
Richer levels of information and connectivity also translate to increased social capital,
which research has repeatedly shown leads to an increased ability of voters to elicit favorable
policies from elected officials. Strmberg (2004) found that communities in the United States
with greater access to radios received greater relief funds from the federal government
during the New Deal. Given the increase in both information (through the increase in
newspaper circulation) and exchange of ideas through the mail, we would expect voters
receiving RFD to increase their ability to garner favorable policies from Representatives.
In Strmberg’s model, this increase in political power is driven by an increased likelihood
that voters learn about the behavior of their elected officials. When one group becomes
better informed, politicians change their behavior by choosing policies favored by the better
informed group. Within the context of RFD, this translates to a prediction that rural
communities receiving more routes will see the behavior of Representatives shift towards
policies favored by rural communities.
This paper contributes to two literatures: the relationship between information and
political behavior, and historical studies of the effects of the establishment of RFD. The
complex relationship between voter information and politics has received considerable at-
6tention through both theoretical and empirical research. Milligan et al. (2004), found that
higher levels of education lead to increased political involvement in the U.S. and the U.K.
Gerber et al. (2009), using data from a field experiment in the Washington D.C. area, found
that people who received a left-leaning newspaper were eight percent more likely to vote for
a Democrat for Governor. Gentzkow et al. (2006) found the conversion of newspapers from
politically affiliated to independent, which occurred rapidly in the period before 1920, to
be correlated with a fall in political corruption. Drago et al. (2013) showed that newspaper
exit in Italy corresponded to decreases in political efficiency (as measured by corruption).
In the development literature, several experiments have found that information plays a
crucial role in the way voters hold politicians accountable in terms of corruption. Ferraz
and Finan (2008) showed that when audits reported two instances of corruption of mayoral
incumbents in Brazil, likelihood of re-election decreased by seven percent compared to the
control group. Banerjee et al. (2010) conducted a field experiment in India, finding that
when voters were provided with newspapers reporting on audits of incumbents, they ex-
hibited high levels of sophistication in their voting, rewarding high-performing incumbents,
while average-performing incumbents received no such boost.
The motivation for such empirical work lies in voting models of imperfect information
and models outlining the social motivation for voting. The importance of well-informed
voters goes back to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (1785), which relied on well-informed voters.
In describing what they call the “Swing Voter’s Curse”, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)
illustrate the role of information both on the decision of potential voters to participate in
an election, and the ability of voters to influence the behavior of others. The “Bandwagon
Effect”, as described by Simon (1954), Bowden (1987), and Mehrabian (1998), predicts
that people will become more inclined to vote for a candidate as the candidate’s odds of
winning increase. Within the context of information networks, richer networks may allow
voters to better identify their most preferred candidate, and to coordinate behind their
preferred candidates. Assuming that larger parties are already known to more candidates,
these effects would be felt most strongly by smaller, less salient candidates.
7The literature on Rural Free Delivery is less rich. While Fuller (1955, 1959, 1964)
provide valuable historical context on the establishment of Rural Free Delivery, few pa-
pers have used RFD to test economic or political science hypotheses. Carpenter (2000)
investigates models of state building through several large-scale postal initiatives (includ-
ing RFD), while Kernell (2001) considers the effect of the individual political gains that
members of Congress believed they would receive with the implementation of RFD during
the Post Office’s transition from a system of patronage to a service. Though RFD rapidly
changed millions of individuals’ access to information, we are unaware of any research that
attempts to use RFD to explore causal effects of information acquisition on political out-
comes. Using the richness of county-level data, along with the variation in which areas
benefited from RFD, we explore how trends in political behavior correlate with voters’
access to information.
1.3 Rural Free Delivery
While daily mail delivery is now taken for granted, the disparity in the quality of service
between rural and urban households in the U.S. in the late nineteenth century is difficult
to overstate. Though people living in cities enjoyed close proximity to post offices or direct
home delivery (often two or three times daily in the largest cities (Greathouse, 1900)),
households in rural areas had no access to daily mail and had to pick up any mail at the
nearest post office, generally several miles away from their homes. RFD was conceived
of as a way to address this disparity of postal service by bringing free daily mail to rural
residents. Under the system, rural routes were established, emanating from existing post
offices, which were served daily by rural carriers, who were postal employees. Any family
wishing to be served by the system needed only to erect a weatherproof box along the route
to receive mail (the service was free in that no cost but postage was required).
Early advocates of RFD highlighted the programs potential to alleviate the monotony
of rural life. In 1900 State Senator Thomas J. Lindley of Indiana applauded RFD, writing
8that “[the farmer] no longer feels the isolation of country life. I think the system will
contribute largely to prevent the threatened congestion of population in our cities and
town” (Greathouse, 1900). Before daily delivery brought mail to their doorsteps, the only
way for rural homes to receive news or receive or send mail was to travel to the nearest
fourth class post office, which was typically the nearest general store. Even in the best
conditions, a trip to the post office for someone who lived five miles away would likely
entail three and a half hours spent on travel alone; this was unlikely to be a feasible trip
for rural residents to make every day. Conditions were seldom ideal, making travel time
much longer, and the mail itself was often delayed (Fuller, 1964, pg. 15). Families living
on farms would sometimes go weeks at a time without mail in periods of bad weather.
The first high profile call for RFD came in 1891, from Postmaster General John Wana-
maker. As a way to test the feasibility of RFD, he proposed that the Post Office implement
limited delivery in a few rural towns (Fuller, 1964, pg. 18). This experiment was delayed
for several years due to insufficient allocation of funds from Congress and two changes in
Postmaster in three years. (Fuller, 1964, pg. 21, 24). Finally, in 1896, the first experi-
mental routes, (eighty-two in all) were established, with the stated intention of choosing
locations which varied as much as possible (Fuller, 1964, pg. 39). In 1898, when only
412 routes existed nationwide, the Post Office formalized the mechanism for route alloca-
tion: communities wishing to receive a route were to petition their Representative, and
route establishment required approval from both Representative and Postmaster. Due to
several well-publicized successes in county-wide RFD networks, Congresspeople were inun-
dated with petitions from farm communities hoping to use the new service. In the face
of widespread support for the program from constituents, even Representatives initially
opposed to RFD were forced to support the program (Carpenter, 2000).
The 1903 Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture described the pro-
cess thus:
The delivery of mails by rural carriers is extended in response to petitions
presented by the people desiring the service upon forms prepared by the De-
9partment, which include a diagram of the proposed route. It is required that
the route shall be from 20 to 25 miles in length, so laid out that the carrier will
not have to traverse the same road on his return as on his outward trip, and
so adjusted that at least 100 domiciles shall be included in the service. Such a
petition, when presented to the Department with the approval of the Congres-
sional Representative of the district or of one of the Senators from the State
in which the service is asked for, is investigated by one of the special agents in
the field, who transmits the papers, with a map of the route or routes to be
followed, to the Superintendent in Washington for his adjudication.
These guidelines are the same as those outlined by the Post Office in 1898, and were
determined by the feasibility and cost effectiveness of mail delivery. One hundred families
was deemed to be the minimum number of households necessary to financially justify a
route, while twenty-five miles was viewed as the longest route mail carriers could reliably
serve year-round. It should be noted that while road and weather conditions varied across
the country, resulting in large variation in what a carrier could cover, these regulations
applied equally to all communities; even if a town had the misfortune of featuring rough
terrain or impassable roads, the Post Office would not exhibit leniency in its decision to
approve or reject a route. Additionally, these official guidelines were largely unchanged
during the duration of the rollout of RFD.5 It is important for our identification strategy
that these guidelines were not determined by Congresspeople, whose motivations may have
been political.
In addition to the regulations noted above, routes could not be established where roads
were not passable year-round (Fuller, 1964, pg. 182). Additionally “Rural” was defined as
places outside an incorporated area (Greathouse, 1900), and no home within two miles of
a post office was eligible.
Rapid expansion of RFD followed quickly, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. Between
1900 and 1908, the number of RFD routes increased from 1,259 to 39,777. Though many
communities were left unserved additional route allocation all but halted by 1908. By that
year, more than 88% of routes that would ever be extant had been established (Kernell,
5In later years of the rollout (post-1904), the Post Office loosened the requirements to allow for routes
serving as few as sixty families.However, this change appeared to be the results of increased Congressional
funding and decreases in transportation costs.
10
2001); the Post Offices stated goal of “universal delivery” had been nearly achieved. In
fact, during the 1910 Postal Appropriations hearing in front of Congress, Fourth Assistant
Postmaster General P.V. De Graw claimed that all communities qualifying for RFD under
the 1898 guidelines had received routes, and that only liberalization of the rules regarding
the number of houses served (from 100 to 60) allowed for further route allocation (None,
1912, pg. 462). Additionally, in 1909, facing a deficit in the Treasury, President Taft
ordered that budgets be cut dramatically, which made route creation significantly more
difficult (Fuller, 1964, pg. 78). For these reasons, we consider the rollout of RFD to be the
years 1901 to 1908. In our analysis, we consider only pre- and post-rollout years.
It is clear that route allocation was correlated with a number of factors that were likely
associated with different levels of political activity. To obtain a route, communities had to
apply for routes; therefore, more motivated communities would have received routes more
quickly. Additionally, because routes required sponsorship by a Congressperson, a commu-
nity’s success in receiving a route would be a function of Congressperson characteristics,
specifically party membership, at the time of the rollout and experience. RFD was, in its
infancy, seen as a Republican program, and Carpenter (2000) provides evidence that route
allocation was denser in districts featuring Republican incumbents.
To measure a causal effect of RFD, to address this endogeneity problem, we therefore
use both place and time fixed effects and instrumental variables. By using county (and
later in our analysis, Congressional district) level fixed effects, we control for time-invariant,
unobserved location characteristics. However, as we will show, even the inclusion of fixed
effects will likely still lead to a bias in our estimates. Second, to address the non-random
allocation of routes, we use a set of instruments correlated with route allocation. In the
presence of place fixed effects, our identifying assumption for our instruments is that they
be uncorrelated with trends in our outcome variables, instead of levels. Our instruments
make use of the requirement that routes be only placed along passable roads; to this extent,
route allocation was a function of both climate conditions during the rollout of RFD,
and of decisions made by both State- and County-level politicians in the years before the
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announcement of RFD.
1.4 Effect on Voters
The estimation of the effect of RFD rollout on voter behavior proceeds in two parts: a
fixed-effects estimation (section 1.4.1) and, to address the bias of the fixed-effects coef-
ficients, an instrumental variables estimation (section 1.4.2). The bulk of the data is
discussed in section 1.4.1.1, while the collection of the data for the instrument is discussed
in section 1.4.2.1.
1.4.1 Fixed-Effects Estimation
To better understand how counties that received more rural free delivery routes changed
compared to those that received fewer, we use a fixed-effects model with year and place
fixed effects to control for time and place-invariant characteristics. The basic specification
for each of our county-level political outcomes is:
Yct = βRoutesct + γc + δt + µXct + uct (1.1)
where Yct are our political outcomes, such as voter turnout; γc and δt are a set of county
and year dummies; Xct is a vector of county characteristics: percent of population in the
county living in communities of more than 2,500 people and the square of that value, the
percent of farmland that is “improved”, the percent of residents that are not white, the
percent of residents that are foreign-born and white,6 the natural log of the population, and
dummies for the presence of Jim Crow voting laws and whether women have the right to
vote; Routesct is the number of routes a county had in year t. Therefore, β, the coefficient
on the number of routes, is out estimate of the causal effect of mail routes.
Our focus in this paper is on the effects of the complete allocation of routes, as opposed
to the timing of route allocation. We therefore eliminate the years 1901 to 1907 from our
6All percents are expressed as a number between 0 and 100.
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analysis. Additionally, we hold the number of routes in all years 1908 and later constant
at their 1908 values, and all year 1900 and earlier fixed at their 1900 values. Because many
election characteristics, such as the number of candidates, vary only at the Congressional
District level, districts typically include several counties, we cluster standard errors at the
district level.
1.4.1.1 Data
We compiled and digitized the county-level RFD route allocations using the 1908 United
States Official Postal Guide, which listed the number of RFD routes emanating from each
post office. This gives a measure of the intensity of RFD service within a county. This is,
to our knowledge, the first attempt to compile statistics on the full allocation of routes.
We also compiled the 1900 number of routes in each county using the 1900 Report of the
Postmaster-General.
Our voting data are from Clubb et al. (2006), which provides data on county-level
voting in each year, including total number of votes, turnout, and vote share for most
major and minor parties. County characteristics data are from Haines (2010), we then
use the method described in Hornbeck (2010) to harmonize the county boundaries to their
1890 values. Voting behavior of elected officials come from the DW-Nominate scores, as
described in Poole and Rosenthal (2001).
Our newspaper dataset was constructed by supplementing an existing dataset by Gentzkow
et al. (2012), which provides circulation data on all English-language daily newspapers
printed within a county, excluding professional or social publications. We added data
on semi-weekly and three times weekly papers, using the N.W. Ayer and Sons American
Newspaper Annual. This variable does not provide perfect data on newspaper readership,
as all newspapers printed within a county are counted in the circulation within a county,
and newspapers consumed in counties different from where they are printed are incorrectly
attributed to the county in which the paper is printed. Gentzkow et al. (2012) estimate
that more than 80% of current newspapers are read in counties in which they were printed,
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and this estimate is likely larger for our period of study.
Table 1.1 shows the trends in most of our outcome and explanatory variables, it does not
show statistics on mid-term elections but those are included in our sample. Voter turnout
decreases significantly over our sample period, and newspaper circulation significantly in-
creases. By comparing the change in daily newspaper circulation to that of biweekly and
three-times weekly newspapers, we can see that the increase in circulation is driven entirely
by the expansion of daily papers (as expected from the work of Fuller (1964)). Table 1.2
provide the average treatment for counties, as measured by the allocation of routes in 1908.
The average number of routes was about 14, while 81% of all counties received at lease one
route.
1.4.1.2 Fixed Effects Results
First, we consider voter turnout in Congressional elections, using as our dependent variable
the percentage of eligible, voting-age adults who cast a vote in elections. Table 1.3 shows
the OLS regression results; an additional route is correlated with a decrease in the percent
of eligible voters who cast ballots by 0.0503 in Congressional elections (compared to a
mean of 59.4). A 1 standard deviation change in the number of routes results in a 0.719
percentage point change in turnout. However, this result is not statistically significant. We
also convert our route variable into a dummy variable equal to 1 if a county has a route, and
0 otherwise. Our results are roughly consistent with the use of a continuous independent
variable. Receiving RFD at all is associated with a 2.484%, statistically significant drop in
voter turnout.
Next, as seen in table 1.3, we turn to measurements of election competition. Specifically,
we construct a set of variables that measure the number of candidates who receive vote
shares above certain thresholds. Since any threshold is arbitrary, we use several (5, 10,
and 20 percent). These thresholds have no political significance; we are using them only
to measure the number of parties that achieve a level of political support within a county.
The results from the OLS regression of the effect of routes on the number of parties,
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shown in columns 3-5 of table 1.3, show that more routes are associated with broader
support for parties, as counties receiving more routes change their voting behavior by
voting for a wider variety of parties. Regardless the of threshold, the coefficient on RFD
routes is statistically significant, with an additional route being associated with an increase
in the number of competitive parties within a county of between 0.0041 and 0.0059.
To better understand these findings, we consider the vote share of small parties, which
we identify as any party other than Republican and Democratic parties. Using this vote
share (out of 100) as the dependent variable, we use the same specification as before. The
motivation behind this dependent variable is to determine if some parties benefit more
than other from the increase in information. Lower information transmission costs may
be more beneficial to small parties, whose low visibility may have made it difficult to
attract votes before the introduction of RFD. Additionally, voters’ ability to coordinate
behind candidates could increase with the introduction of RFD, especially for less visible
candidates.
The results are presented in column 6 of Table 1.3. The coefficient of 0.12 is statistically
significant, with a t-statistic of 3.18. This coefficient means that a one standard deviation
change in the number of routes is associated with a 0.13 standard deviation change in the
vote share of small parties within a county. Taken along with the results from columns 3-5,
we can see that counties that receive more routes change their voting behavior by voting
for a wider range of parties, to the benefit of smaller political parties.
The effect of RFD on turnout may seem counter-intuitive. However given the endoge-
nous nature of route allocation, we cannot interpret the OLS estimates as measuring causal
effects, and previous research suggests a downward bias to all of our estimates. Kernell and
McDonald (1999) provide evidence that Congresspeople facing competitive elections prior
to the establishment of RFD were more motivated in acquiring routes for their districts.
Voter turnout is typically higher in competitive elections, as is the number of competitive
parties. This means that we should expect to see above average voter turnout and compet-
itiveness in the years before RFD associated with high levels of route allocation. If these
15
variables drop in the period after RFD, either because politicians have bought votes and
reduced competition, or simply because of regressions to the mean, OLS estimates of each
of our effects would be downwardly biased. We can test this hypothesis in with our data,
this is discussed below.
We next test the Kernell and McDonald (1999) hypothesis that that Congresspeople
facing competitive elections prior to the establishment of RFD were more motivated in
acquiring routes directly. Using a cross-section of our data (using only 1908 values) we
regress the number of routes allocated to a county as a function of community characteris-
tics and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the county was within a district with a competitive
election before the introduction of RFD, and 0 otherwise. Specifically, we construct a set
of dummy variables, indicating whether a district had an election with a margin of victory
of 10 percentage points or less, 5 points for less, and 2.5 or less in any of the four elections
prior to the establishment of RFD (1894, 1896, 1898, 1900).
Table 1.4 presents the results for this regressions. When we define close elections
broadly, we fail to observe a strong positive relationship between the closeness of elections
and route allocation. However, when we look only at very close elections, we see a signifi-
cantly positive relationship. Counties within districts that had an election decided by 2.5
percentage points or less enjoy an average of 2.2 more routes than counties without close
elections, even after controlling for county characteristics. These results support the claim
that our OLS results for voter turnout are downwardly biased.
1.4.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation
To address the bias of the fixed-effects coefficients, we use three sets of instruments for
the number of routes a county receives. In choosing suitable instruments, we focus on the
requirement that routes be placed along passable roads. The ability for communities to
successfully petition for an RFD route will be correlated to the quality of roads over that
time period. With the existence of place fixed effects, our goal is to find variables that will
affect road quality in a time-invariant way. Therefore, even if the variable is correlated with
16
levels of political activity, it will fall into the place fixed effect, and will be uncorrelated
with the error term in our second stage regression.
First, we take the average rainfall in a county, as measured in 1901. In 1902, RFD be-
came a permanent service of the Post Office. A large number of routes were petitioned for,
and subsequently approved or rejected in the years immediately following. Approximately
45 percent of these petitions (once they were approved by Congresspeople) were rejected
by postal officials, often because of poor road conditions. Areas that received rainfall
quantities that were best suited for road construction therefore received more routes.
The effect of rainfall on road quality, and therefore route allocation, relates to the road
construction technology at the time. King-road drags, a double ‘bladed’ style of drag, were
popular of a range of machines that grated and smoothed roads, maintenance the farmers
themselves were responsible for. According to the Farm and Garden Rule-Book (Baily,
1919),
...[the king road drag] does the best work when the soil is moist and yet not
too sticky. This is frequently within a half-day’s time after a rain. When the
earth is in this state it works the best, and the effects of working it are fully as
beneficial as at any other time....It often takes a whole season for the road to
become properly puddled and baked to withstand the rains and traffic. After
a road has been worked with a drag only a short time, it is not well to expect
it to stand up to heavy traffic during a continued damp spell without being
affected.
Therefore, we would expect counties with both very high and very low levels of rainfall
to be allocated fewer routes. Figure 1.2, which shows the correlation between rainfall
and route allocation, supports this hypothesis. Each point represents the average number
of routes per thousand for 25 different bins, as determined by the amount of rainfall.
Communities with moderate amounts of rainfall received more routes per person than
communities with very high or very low amounts of rain. With this in mind, we will use
rainfall (in inches) and its square as one set of instruments.
Second, we use data on the county-level spending of roads and bridges in 1890. By that
time, roads and highways funded by the federal government had become severely neglected,
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and the federal and state governments had largely left any road funding to counties and
townships (Fuller, 1955). Because 1890 is well before the establishment of even the first
experimental RFD routes, and before the creation of the Office of Road Inquiry in 1893,
which would later become the National Highway Administration, it would have impossible
for county officials to have anticipated federal help or to build roads in anticipation of
preferential rural route allocation. Additionally, with the establishment of the Office of
Road Inquiry, government responsibility for roads were no longer fell on counties, so the
concern for auto-correlation of county spending in years during our sample is minimized.
Our final instrument is a set of laws that outline the statutory environment in each state
at the onset of RFD route allocation. According to the Office of Road Inquiry, most state
laws concerning the establishment of roads before 1885 were largely ineffectual. Between
1888 and 1895, almost every state passed numerous laws related to roads. The nature of
these laws would have lasting impacts on the later ability of rural communities to establish
roads. Therefore, these laws can be used as instruments for route allocation. These laws,
which are at the state level, will be used in combination with the county-level instruments.
In the case of the 1890 spending variable, with many zeroes in the data, this will provide
valuable variation.
Thus, the first stage of our two stage least squares estimation will be:
Routesct = φRainfallc ∗ Postct + σRainfall2c ∗ Postct + δt + γc + βXct + ect (1.2)
or
Routesct = φLawsc ∗ Postct + σZc ∗ Postct + δt + γc + βXct + ect (1.3)
where Routesct is the number of routes in county c and year t; Rainfallc is the amount of
rain in 1901; Lawsc is the set of law dummies; Z is our county-level instrument; δt and γc
are time and county fixed effects; Xct is the set of covariates used in our second stage. We
interacted each of our instruments with a Postct dummy variable, equal to 1 if the year is
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1908 or after, and 0 otherwise. Due to the existence of place fixed effects, we are essentially
estimating the change in routes between the pre- and post-rollout years.
The results from this first stage regression are provided in Table 1.5. This shows that
each of our instruments is a strong predictor of route allocation. As expected the coefficient
on rainfall is positive, while its square is negative, indicating that counties with moderate
rainfall receive the most routes. Increased 1890 spending in roads and bridges is associated
with increased RFD route allocation a decade later. The coefficients on the set of law
dummy variables reveals a complex relationship between the statutory environment and
the allocation of routes. While some laws, specifically the creation of road commissioners
and offices that oversee the construction and maintenance of roads, leads to increases in
the number of routes, several laws (the creation of road districts, the use of state money,
and the use of convict labor) actually lead to decreases in RFD routes. This result may be
attributable to the legislatures focusing on highway, as opposed to local road, construction.
Convict labor, for instance, was often used to break rocks, which were far more useful in
the construction of highways than for use in rural roads.7 As the F-statistics show, while
each of our county-level instruments is sufficiently strong, the set of state laws is too weak
to be used as an instrument by itself. Therefore, we use this state-level instrument in
conjunction with each of our two county-level instruments.
Given the existence of time fixed-effects in our analysis, the identifying assumption for
our specification is that an instrument for the number of routes be uncorrelated with trends
in our outcome variables; time-related shocks must be identical across treatment groups.
This allows us to select instruments that are correlated with levels of our outcome variables,
which is typically a violation of the exclusion restriction, provided they are uncorrelated
with trends. Therefore, we can compare pre- and post-treatment trends across different
values of our instrumental variables. See appendix A.2 for further discussion.
7We will present the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic with our IV regressions.
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1.4.2.1 Data
The rainfall dataset came from the U.S. Historical Climatology Network, which provides
monthly and annual rainfall data for each climatological station in the U.S. For counties
with one station, the average monthly rainfall in 1901 was recorded as the rainfall for
that county. When more than one station existed within a county, we took the average of
all stations within the county. For counties with no climatological stations, we took the
averages of all values for contiguous counties. The dataset on county-level spending on
roads and bridges was constructed using the Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the
Eleventh Census, 1890: Valuation and Taxation.
To determine the state laws passed with regards to local road construction, we use a
unique set of documents that provide data on laws passed by state legislatures in the period
immediately before the establishment of the first RFD routes. “State Laws Relating to the
Management of Roads: Enacted in 1888-1893” (Stone, 1894), and “State Laws Relating to
the Management of Roads: Enacted in 1894-1895” (Stone, 1896), both published by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Road Inquiry, and “The Report of the Industrial
Commission on Prison Labor” (Pri, 1900). These documents provide a thorough account
of the legislative actions taken on the state level Using the data from these reports, we
construct a set of dummy variables indicating whether a state had passed a law governing
a specific characteristic of local road governance. After reviewing the laws, we found that
all relevant legislation fell into one of the following categories.
1. Establishment of road commissioners, or empowering county commissioners to govern
roads; in smaller states this took the form of the establishment of state road offices
2. Outlining road quality rules, or establishing office of overseer or viewer
3. Creation of road districts
4. Allocating convict labor for the use of road construction
5. Allocation of state money for road construction
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We constructed a dataset with a full set of five dummy variables, each equal to 1 if a state
passed a law concerning each aspect of road construction, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1.3 provides an overview of the behavior of state legislators with regards to
road construction, and reveals several interesting regional patterns. First, Southern states,
where poor road quality was continually noted as an impediment to the approval of peti-
tions for RFD routes, had few laws governing the construction of roads. All Gulf Coast and
Southern Atlantic states, from Texas to Virginia, had no more than one law type on the
books in 1896. Most of these laws concerned with the use of convict labor which likely did
little to help establish suitable roads in locations where RFD routes were demanded. Mid-
western states, with the exception of Illinois (which issued recommendations, but passed
no laws) and Ohio, passed legislation, in most cases several laws. Western states seemed
particularly proactive in passing legislation.
1.4.2.2 IV Results
The results from the IV regression of voter turnout on the number of routes are presented
in Table 1.6.8 Column 1 shows the results when rainfall, its square, and the set of state
laws are the set of instruments; column 2 shows the results when 1890 county-level spend-
ing and state laws are the set of instruments. The negative correlation seen in the OLS
results disappears, and we now observe a positive causal effect. When using rainfall as an
instrument, an additional route leads to a 0.11 increase in turnout, and when using spend-
ing, we find a 0.54 increase, though statistical significance is only observed when using
county-level spending as an instrument. A one standard deviation change in routes leads
to a 1.57 and 7.7 percentage point change in turnout, respectively. While the direction of
our results are robust to the choice of instruments, we see significant variation in the point
8Regressions for the instrumental variable modes were calculated using STATA’s xtivreg2 command.
Residual sum of squares is calculated using the structural equation, instead of the residuals for second-
stage regression. Therefore, the residual sum of squares could be greater than the total sum of squares,
resulting in a negative model sum of squares, and therefore a negative r-squared. Woolridge (2006) warns
against making statistical judgments from r-squared in IV regressions, since its value does not have the
standard interpretation of the squared correlation coefficient, and the negative values do not mean that the
model in fact performs badly.
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estimate. Given the heterogeneity across our sample, which includes most counties in the
country, there is likely similar variation in how the instruments affect route allocation. For
instance, New England counties varied little in the value of 1890 county spending, since
funding decisions were typically made by the state and township. Rainfall varied little
across the northern Midwest, so this instrument would likely be less useful in explaining
variation in route allocation in this region. Since the instruments affected different popu-
lations, the two coefficients, instead of being interpreted as different estimates of the same
average treatment effect, can be better described as different estimates of separate local
average treatment effects.
The IV results for the number of parties receiving votes, shown in table 1.7 match
the OLS finding of a positive causal effect, and also suggest a downward bias of the OLS
regressions. Neither the sign nor statistical significance of each of our coefficients changes
from the OLS regression, and the findings for both set of IV are larger by a factor of
about four. The point estimates range from 0.013 to 0.027, depending on the threshold
and instrument used, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the number of
routes leads to an increase of between 0.2 and 0.4 in the number of parties competitive in
an election. Again, because these vote share thresholds have no inherent meaning, we are
using them to show that our results for the number of parties competing within a district
are robust to the threshold used to define it.
Table 1.8 present the IV regressions when using the vote share of small parties, which
are consistent with downward bias of OLS estimates. The point estimates of 0.58 and 0.9
represent significant increases over the OLS estimate of 0.12. While the coefficients for the
IV regression may appear at first very high (the average vote share of small parties was
only 3.15 in 1908), the magnitude is not very different than the coefficients for the other
IV regressions; a one standard deviation change in the number of routes leads to a change
of between 0.60 and 0.93 standard deviations in the vote share of small parties.
To summarize, the IV regressions for each of our county-level voter behavior variables
show the presence of downward bias in OLS regressions, consistent with previous research.
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The causal effect of RFD routes is a slight increase in voter turnout, and the statistical
significance of this finding depends on the instrument used. For each of our measures of
the distribution of votes across a county, the IV regressions are roughly consistent with
the OLS findings: route allocation leads to a wider distribution of votes across parties,
with increased vote shares for small parties. These findings are robust to the choice of
instruments.
1.5 Potential Mechanisms
The results presented up to this point have not made any attempt to disentangle the
mechanisms through which RFD affected political behavior. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine if RFD changed political behavior because of increases in the mail, because
of an increase in road quality, or for some other reason. Accounts from the turn of the
twentieth century suggest that these changes were largely driven by increase in the amount
of information that farmers received, notably from the newly feasible daily newspaper.
Using a dataset on newspapers, which provided a valuable source of political information,
we can compare how our previous results differ across counties with differing access to daily
news.
Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that the introduction of rural routes in-
creased the circulation of newspapers. One of the first reports from local postmen on the
effect of RFD included the following statement by a postal worker in Oregon (Yea, 1903):
Before free delivery was started there were 13 daily papers taken at Turner
(OR) post office. Today there are 113. This shows that the farmers are getting
in touch with the world and are quick to avail themselves of all educational
facilities.
In Table 1.9, we see that one additional route is associated with a 1.7 percent increase
in total newspaper readership. Breaking these results down between daily and semi-weekly
newspapers, it is clear that all of this effect comes from an increase in daily newspaper
readership.
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The potential for newspapers to impact political behavior follows directly from their role
as a conveyor of information about policy debates, news of social or political importance,
and even candidate’s behavior. For example, over a one week span in 1904, the Bemidji
(MN) Daily Pioneer included stories about the Wisconsin Secretary of State completing the
state’s ballot, an Indiana Senator speaking at Indiana University, and an illness contracted
by a Minnesota gubernatorial candidate (Bemidji Pioneer, October 24 – October 28, 1904).
To test the hypothesis that newspapers were an important mechanism through which
RFD routes affected political behavior, we divide our sample into counties with newspapers
and those without newspapers. To ensure that our sub-samples do not change over time,
we define a county as having a newspaper only if it has a newspaper by 1900. We then
run the IV regressions on each of the subsections separately. We then perform the IV
regressions outlined above, using spending as a an instrument (using rainfall is used as an
instrument, does not significantly change our results and are not presented here).
Out results, shown in Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 show that, for several of the outcome
variables, the results differ dramatically across sub-samples. For one of our measures
of election competition, the number of parties receiving votes, we observe different causal
effects. About 75 percent of counties take on values of 0 for the newspaper dummy variable,
and the estimates are about as precisely estimates as in previous IV regressions, so these
findings are not the results of a loss of precision in our estimates.
If RFD only affected political behavior through the effect of better roads (or any other
mechanism that would be independent of newspapers) we would expect the coefficient
on the number of routes would be identical for both groups. However, for each variable
describing the distribution of votes, the causal effect in counties with newspapers differs
significantly from counties without newspapers.
These results suggest that changes in voting behavior caused by RFD were stronger
(and in some cases only present) if a county had a daily newspaper. There are two potential
explanations for these results: people in counties with newspapers react differently from
identical treatment than people living with counties without newspapers; or, the presence
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of newspapers affects the nature of treatment by serving as a mechanism through which
political information can be transmitted.
1.5.1 Congressional Votes
Each of the results to this point have focused on the behavior of voters. We look now at
the behavior of elected officials. With richer information networks, voters may select dif-
ferent attributes for their Representatives, or they may elicit different actions from elected
officials. Taking our motivation from Strmberg (2004), we consider the potential effect
that better informed voters may have on Representatives. Voters may punish Represen-
tatives who act against the voters’ wishes, but will only do so if they are aware of the
representative’s actions. Therefore, if one subset of voters receives a positive shock in their
access to information, we may expect to observe a shift in the policy positions of elected
officials (especially if Representatives are office-motivated) towards positions favorable to
this better-informed subset. Additionally, the increase in turnout by counties may change
the identity of the median voter, resulting in changes of the characteristics of the elected
official. By using DW- Nominate scores, which measures the voting behavior of officials
along a 2-dimensional policy space, we measure the effect of rural routes on the policy
decisions of representatives.
The DW-Nominate scores give each elected member of the House of Representatives
two scores, which represent their policy stances based on roll-call votes, over two dimen-
sions. The first dimension represents the traditional liberal-conservative stances. The
second dimension represent on traditionally social issues (or issues that are less likely to
cut strongly across party lines), and the specific stance associated with this dimension
changes over time. For our analysis, we will focus only on the first dimension. We will
therefore use the DW-Nominate first dimension score as our dependent variable in both
the OLS and IV specifications above, along with a set of political party dummy variables,
equal to 1 if the Representative is a member of the party, and 0 otherwise. Because the
DW-Nominate score only varies at the congressional district level, we aggregate each of
25
our county-level variables up to the district level. For counties that straddle more than
one congressional district, we divide each variable into the number of districts into which
the county is split, and distribute those values evenly across the districts.
To motivate our results, we first consider what stances were typically associated with
rural communities over our sample period. Figure 1.4 shows the correlation between the
percentage of urban residents in a district, and the policy stances of elected officials. Over
the first dimension, we see that, after controlling for party membership, less urban districts
feature more negative Nominate scores. Therefore, we would expect that either an increase
in political power of rural voters, or a rural shift in the identity of the median voter would
lead to a negative shift in the policy scores of elected officials.
Table 1.12 shows the effect of routes on the policy decisions of members of the House of
Representatives. No strong correlation is observed in the OLS results for the effect of RFD
routes over either dimension, as neither result is statistically significant. Our instrumental
variable results, however, show strong causal effects. Districts with more RFD routes see
negative shifts in the DW-Nominate scores of their elected officials. Because our regression
includes dummies for party affiliation, this result cannot be the result of shifts from one
party to another. The point estimates for the IV regressions of -0.00021 and -0.00058
indicate that a one standard deviation change in the number of routes leads to a change of
between 0.035 and 0.095 of one standard deviation in the dependent variable. Therefore,
conditional on the assumption that a negative shift in DW-Nominate scores indicate more
rural-friendly stances, an increased number of routes causes the elected officials adopt
policies more in line with rural voters.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
Though the dramatic impact that Rural Free Delivery had on easing the isolation of rural
communities has been widely recorded and discussed, very little research has explored the
impact of RFD on political outcomes. Using a panel data set on RFD route allocations
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election returns, newspaper circulation, and county characteristics, we find that routes led
to significant changes in a several crucial ways.
We find that our results are robust to the choice of instruments; RFD leads to increases
in voter turnout, a wider distribution of votes, and shifts in the behavior of elected offi-
cials towards policies associated with rural communities. The IV coefficients measured do
not provide causal effects for information networks directly, but for the establishment of
RFD routes. Therefore, the extent to which we can take these findings as the causal ef-
fect of information flows are limited to the extent that RFD changed the structure of rural
communities by changing their access to information. For the county-level measures of elec-
tion competition, our results differ between counties with and without newspapers. These
findings provide evidence that newspapers potentially provide an important mechanism.
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Figure 1.1: Rollout of RFD
Figure 1.2: Rainfall and Route Allocation
28
F
ig
u
re
1.
3:
N
u
m
b
er
of
S
ta
te
L
aw
s
29
Figure 1.4: Dw-Nominate Scores
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Means by Year
YEAR 1892 1896 1900 1908 1912 1916
Congressional Turnout 68.02 72.15 68.96 60.55 54.56 58.87
(22.21) (21.59) (22.97) (24.17) (21.93) (21.38)
Candidates 2.39 2.19 1.98 2.02 2.62 2.07
(0.58) (0.47) (0.37) (0.53) (0.92) (0.62)
Small Party Share 12.59 10.03 2.14 3.15 14.86 5.20
(16.13) (17.20) (5.56) (5.40) (14.77) (12.44)
Total Newspaper Circ 1,774 2,207 4,356 7,391 9,039 10,988
(9,869) (12,097) (42,102) (72,529) (88,091) (102,439)
Daily Newspaper Circ 1,746 2,176 4,312 7,350 9,001 10,968
(9,848) (12,083) (42,098) (72,529) (88,077) (102,440)
Percent Improved Farmland 55.64 52.90 52.82 56.14 56.51 57.35
(22.59) (23.56) (24.80) (24.21) (24.41) (23.82)
Percent Urban 12.46 12.69 14.22 15.98 18.35 19.13
(20.92) (21.21) (21.44) (22.77) (23.62) (24.25)
Ln(Population) 9.55 9.58 9.62 9.78 9.81 9.84
(1.12) (1.13) (1.13) (1.00) (1.03) (1.04)
Non-white 9.92 11.97 11.06 10.67 9.26 8.75
(17.52) (19.93) (18.92) (18.66) (17.30) (16.32)
Percent Foreign 11.59 10.77 9.63 9.21 9.38 8.73
(12.41) (11.52) (10.47) (9.78) (9.40) (8.73)
Observations 2,162 2,249 2,308 2,342 2,191 2,148
Note: Because there are some missing counties in the election data,
the number of observations is not identical for each year.
Table 1.2: Summary of Rural Free Delivery Allocation in 1908
(1)
RFD Routes 14.36
(14.09)
Percent of Counties with Routes 81
(39)
Observations 2,422
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Table 1.4: Determinants of Route Allocation
Margin of Victory and Route Allocation
Dependent Variable: Number of Routes
VARIABLES 10 Percent 5 Percent 2.5 Percent
Close Election 0.0513 .977 2.207***
(0.771) (.780129) .8357712
% Urban -0.0346*** -0.0345*** -0.0343***
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0113)
% Nonwhite -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0146)
% Improved Farmland 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211***
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122)
% Foreign -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.268***
(0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0324)
Ln(Population) 5.857*** 5.849*** 5.833***
(0.294) (0.294) (0.294)
Observations 2,574 2,574 2,574
R-squared 0.615 0.616 0.617
% of Counties With 14.6 12.4 10.0
Close Elections
Standard errors, clustered at Congressional District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: First Stage Regression
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument Instrument Instrument
VARIABLES Rainfall Spending State Law
Rainfall 1.024***
(0.0618)
Rainfall Squared -0.0119***
(0.000675)
Road Spending 0.000100***
(2.41e-05)
Road Districts -6.815**
(2.866)
State Money -6.677**
(2.722)
Convict Labor -6.474***
(2.072)
Oversight 0.606
(2.745)
Governance 7.035**
(3.161)
% Urban 0.244*** 0.292*** 0.252***
(0.0277) (0.0497) (0.0357)
% Improved Farmland -0.0379* -0.0578* -0.0484
(0.0223) (0.0338) (0.0475)
% Nonwhite 0.230*** 0.662*** 0.377**
(0.0619) (0.136) (0.145)
% Foreign -0.0129 0.154* 0.249
(0.0627) (0.0877) (0.194)
Ln(Population) -7.805*** -11.30*** -9.250***
(0.778) (0.958) (1.402)
Observations 21,824 11,096 22,275
F-Stat (excluded instruments) 157.52 34.38 4.06
R-squared 0.775 0.781 0.778
Counties/States 2409 1151 43
Standard errors, clustered at Congressional District level, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: IV Regression: Turnout
(1) (2)
Instrument: Instrument:
VARIABLES Rainfall Spending
RFD Routes 0.110* 0.542***
(0.0573) (0.0733)
% Urban -0.142*** -0.214***
(0.0353) (0.0381)
% Improved Farmland 0.0407 0.0923**
(0.0391) (0.0410)
% Nonwhite 0.00425 -0.204
(0.133) (0.138)
% Foreign -0.569*** -0.629***
(0.0715) (0.0818)
Ln(Population) -1.989 1.872
(1.495) (1.397)
Observations 21,671 22,212
R-squared 0.303 0.274
Counties 2334 2403
Wald Stat. 76.91 51.89
Standard errors, clustered at Congressional District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: IV Regression: Small Party Share
Instument Rainfall Spending
RFD Routes 0.584*** 0.916***
(0.0668) (0.0776)
% Urban -0.0505 -0.148***
(0.0357) (0.0395)
% Imp. Farmland -0.0524* -0.0273
(0.0280) (0.0298)
% Nonwhite -0.235*** -0.354***
(0.0901) (0.101)
% Foreign 0.252*** 0.264***
(0.0634) (0.0707)
Ln(Population) 2.991*** 6.139***
(1.018) (1.052)
Observations 21,671 22,204
R-squared -0.0274 -0.1458
Counties 2334 2403
Standard errors, clustered at District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Effect of RFD on Newspaper Readership
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Total Daily Semi-Weekly
Circulation Circulation Circulation
RFD Routes 0.0179*** 0.0184*** -0.00668
(0.00325) (0.00328) (0.00985)
% Urban 0.0487*** 0.0519*** -0.00191
(0.00558) (0.00577) (0.0101)
% Imp.Farmland 0.000376 -0.00300 0.0277
(0.00318) (0.00306) (0.0181)
% Nonwhite 0.0107 0.0104 0.0842
(0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0604)
% Foreign 0.0186** 0.0180** 0.00467
(0.00847) (0.00845) (0.0333)
Ln(Population) 0.203** 0.188** -0.571
(0.0867) (0.0852) (0.657)
Observations 22,433 22,433 1,665
R-squared 0.900 0.916 0.769
Counties 2490 2490 458
Standard errors, clustered at District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Effect of Newspapers
Roll of Newspapers: IV Regression (Spending Instrument)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Small Party Share Small Party Share
RFD Routes 0.569** 0.536***
(0.249) (0.122)
% Urban -0.00795 -0.195**
(0.0911) (0.0819)
% Improved Farmland -0.125* -0.159**
(0.0659) (0.0710)
% Nonwhite -0.336* -0.250
(0.176) (0.427)
% Foreign -0.120 0.0726
(0.190) (0.180)
Ln(Population) 5.087* 4.892*
(2.754) (2.523)
Newspapers No Yes
Observations 15,210 6,994
R-squared -0.020 -0.037
Counties 1,685 718
Clusters 233 260
Standard errors, clustered at Congressional District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Policy Decisions and Route Allocation
Dependent Variable: DW-Nominate Score
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES OLS IV IV
Routes 0.000114 -0.000938** -0.00191***
(0.000221) (0.000432) (0.000689)
% Urban 0.00130 0.00161 0.00190*
(0.00111) (0.00106) (0.00113)
% Imp. Farmland -0.00231* -0.00167 -0.00109
(0.00129) (0.00119) (0.00133)
% Nonwhite -0.00360 -0.00781* -0.0117**
(0.00434) (0.00432) (0.00490)
% Foreign-born -0.00656* -0.0100*** -0.0132***
(0.00358) (0.00372) (0.00424)
Ln(Population) 0.0128 -0.00618 -0.0237
(0.0335) (0.0317) (0.0345)
Observations 2,984 2,975 2,975
R-squared 0.706 0.151 0.104
Rainfall NO YES NO
Spending NO NO YES
Districts 368 359 359
Standard errors, clustered at Congressional District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 2
Duvergers Law and Strategic Voting: an
Empirical Test Using Floridas Elimination of
Primary Runoff Elections
2.1 Introduction
Strategic voting plays a central, if often problematic role in the discussion of optimal voting
mechanisms. The efficiency of voting systems, predictions of theoretical models, and policy
recommendations may differ depending on the extent of strategic voting.
This paper provides an dual test of Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis, one of the best-known
set theoretical predictions regarding strategic voting. The theory is a pair of corresponding
predictions: Duverger’s Law states that “simple-majority single-ballot favors the two party
system”, while Duverger’s Hypothesis states that “simple majority with a second ballot or
proportional representation favors multipartyism”. One of the primary motivations for this
claim is that voters will strategically avoid smaller parties in simple-majority, single-ballot
elections, such as plurality elections, because they are likely to believe that a vote cast for
a small-party candidate cannot affect the outcome of an election.
To test this claim, I consider the state of Florida’s switch from two-round runoff1
1Runoff elections are used extensively throughout the world, and have become an increasingly popular
method of choosing heads of state. Currently, 65% of countries electing presidents do so using a two-round
runoff with a 50% first round threshold, while only 6% of democratic countries did so in 1950 (Bormann and
Golder (2013)). Many newly established democracies, including Egypt and Guinea, use runoff elections.
Runoff elections are also common in the United States and are used in New York, San Francisco, and Dallas,
for mayoral elections and in the southern United States for party primaries.
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elections to plurality elections in party primaries elections following the 2000 election.
Prior to 2000, candidates for the general election were chosen using a two-round election.
If no candidate earned 50% of the vote, a runoff round was held between the top two
vote-getters. Following the law change, the candidate receiving the most votes in the first
round won a party’s nomination. This setting differs from previous research on the effect
of runoff elections in several important ways. United States elections feature low voter
turnouts compared to many other countries. Additionally, the setting investigated here
consists only of primary elections, where each election has only one party.
Most empirical studies have supported the prediction that, compared to plurality sys-
tems, runoff elections lead to either more candidates or more support for lower-placing
candidates. However, the magnitude of this effect has varied significantly over different
samples and empirical strategies. Riker and Wright (1989) found that, from 1950 to 1982,
all else equal, states with runoffs had 2 more candidates in their Democratic primaries in
gubernatorial races than states with plurality systems. Somewhat surprisingly, Engstrom
and Engstrom (2008) performed similar analysis on many of the same same statewide elec-
tions, during the period 1980 to 2002, and found that the average number of candidates
was equal in states with runoffs and states with plurality primary elections, while previous
research has studied general elections with numerous parties.
Abramson et al. (2010) uncovered convincing evidence of strategic voting using data
from the American National Elections Survey. The survey asked respondents about both
their political beliefs and their voting behavior during election years; during three of those
years (1980, 1992, and 1996) third party candidates appeared on ballots nationwide. The
authors showed that, while at least 95 percent of respondents whose favorite candidate
came from a major party ultimately voted for that candidate, only about 60 percent of
respondents whose favorite candidate was a third-party candidate ultimately voted for that
candidate. In each case, the third-party candidate’s chance of winning a plurality election
was minimal, meaning that voters’ decisions to abandon the candidate may have been
strategic.
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Several recent papers have employed natural experiments to test the causal effect pre-
dicted by Duverger’s Law. Bordignon and Tabellinin (2009) and Fujiwara (2011) both
employed regression discontinuity to determine the causal effect of switches between plu-
rality and majority runoff elections on voter or candidate behavior in municipal elections
in Italy and Brazil, respectively. Bordignon et. al. found that runoff elections lead, on
average, to the addition of 1 full candidate in races, while Fujiwara found that races with
runoff elections, while not featuring more candidates, exhibit increased support for candi-
dates finishing outside the top two. Specifically, changing from a pluraility election to a
runoff election increased the vote share for candidates outside the top two by 8.8 percent-
age points. Because the average vote share was 15.5 percent, this represents a more than
50 percent increase in the support of candidates outside the top two. This provides direct
evidence on strategic voting; voters faced with 1 round (with no possibility of a second
round) will be more inclined to vote for their favorite between the top two, even if that
candidate is not their most preferred among all candidates.
Duverger’s original hypothesis outlines two mechanisms through which runoff and plu-
rality elections can yield a different number of candidates Duverger (1954). The “mechan-
ical” effect, concerns the mapping of vote shares into seats. According to the hypothesis,
winning parties are will be over-represented in terms of seats in bodies of government (e.g.,
a party that gets 51% in every election will have 100% of the seats). This effect could limit
the establishment of numerous parties. The other effect, the “psychological” effect, cap-
tures the effect of voting systems on the behavior of candidates (who must decide whether
to enter an election or not) and on voters (who must decide to vote sincerely or not).
Because the setting I am investigating here, primary elections, feature only a single
party for each election, the mechanical effect cannot drive the results, since the setting
itself limits the number of participating parties. Therefore, I am able to isolate only the
psychological effect here.
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2.1.1 Elimination of the Florida Runoff
Runoff elections had been used in primary elections in Flordia since the 1929. Like most
southern states, Florida political parties elected their nominees using two-round elections,
where the top two candidates participated in a runoff election if no candidate won a ma-
jority of the votes in the first round. The first round was traditionally held in the first
week of September, with the second round (if necessary) the first week in October, in
anticipation of the general election in November. General election winners were, and still
are, determined by a plurality vote.
The 2000 Presidential general election triggered a reassessment of voting procedures. In
that election, officials encountered an unusually high number of invalid punch-card ballots,
where a voter’s intent could not be determined. Compounding this complication was a lack
of protocol specifying how recounts were to be held and voter intent was to be determined.
This situation resulted in a lengthy and contentious re-count, which was only ended by
the United States Supreme Courts ruling in Bush v. Gore on December 12, 2000. In
an attempt to fix many of the problems that plagued the 2000 Presidential election, the
Florida legislature enacted several changes to its voting procedure which targeted vote
verification and ballor access. Punch card ballots were banned in favor of optical scan or
touch-screen voting machines, and vote counting technology was standardized statewide,
and voter registration and vote verification systems were streamlined.
Many other states undertook similar (and in some cases identical) measures to update
their own voting systems, either on their own volition, or due to the Help America Vote
Act, a federal law passed in 2002 that mandated many of the changes introduced in the
Florida legislation. Given Florida’s unique political setting, however, these changes to its
voting procedure required a dramatic change in the timing of elections in Florida.
Because much of the HAVA legislation focused on procedures for vote tabulation and
ballot access, election officials across the country were faced with potentially lengthy voter
verification and vote tabulation procedures. Although many other states (including ones
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with primary runoffs) implemented similar procedures, no state conducted as many elec-
tions in as short a window as Florida. In most years, only 10 weeks separated the first
round of primary elections and the general election; by comparison, the state of Texas
usually holds its first round primary in March, and its runoffs in April. No other state
with runoff primaries began is election season after the end of July.
Faced with the uncertainty of the impact that the legislative reform would have on
the vote verification process, Florida lawmakers suspended the runoff election for the 2002
election cycle; after suspending the runoff election again in 2004, the legislature finally
voted in 2005 to permanently eliminate runoff elections. In both 2002 and 2004, the
suspension of runoff elections was made at the request of election supervisors, who claimed
that conducting three elections during Floridas brief election window was infeasible. State
Senator Ron Klein was quoted as saying, “The present system is not working because of
the amount of time between the first and the second primary and the general election.2
Lawmakers chose to suspend, and ultimately eliminate one round of voting instead
of moving both primary round to earlier in the year, due to their uncertainty as to how
rescheduling would affect the composition of voters. Research by the University of Florida
estimated that, in 2003, up to 1.5 million people, or nine percent of the population of
the state, spent at least 30 days outside the state, usually in the summer months. A
great proportion of these travelers were retirees, who are more likely to vote than younger
residents, meaning that the effect of such a move on the population of voters would have a
significant impact on turnout. The sitting incumbents in the Florida Congress disfavored a
potential change in the demographic characteristics of voters. In reference to the decision
to eliminate the runoff election, Governor Jeb Bush was quoted in 2005 as saying, “you
would have to have the first primary at a time that would be, in Florida, difficult, like
August 1. This would maintain the traditional date for our primary.3
Given the identification strategy of this paper, it is crucial that the decision elimination
2”Vote Eliminates Primary Runoffs”. Sun Sentinel, April 29, 2005
3”Senate writes obituary for runoff elections”. Tampa Bay Times, April 29, 2005
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of the runoff election was unrelated to our outcome variables. If the runoff was eliminated
because of changes in voter or candidate behavior, then my estimation process would
suffer from endogeneity. However, in the case of Florida following the 2000 election, it is
clear that the primary runoff was eliminated to accommodate potential complications in
vote verification, which was instigated by the fiasco of the 2000 Presidential election. In
other words, if the 2000 Presidential election not been so problematic (with many of the
issues occurring in only one county, Palm Beach County), then Florida would likely still be
conducting primary runoff elections. The changes in voting procedure occurred nationwide,
and only Florida’s traditional schedule of elections necessitated the elimination of runoff
primaries in that state.
As stated earlier, eliminating the runoff election was not the only act of the Florida
Congress following the 2000 election. The state also introduced no-excuse absentee bal-
lots and provisional voting, each of which changed how elections were conducted. If these
changes in election procedure were unaccounted for, estimates of causal effect would cap-
ture the effect of these changes as well, instead of isolating only the effect of eliminating
the runoff election. Fortunately, other states changed major components of their election
procedure at the same time. In the data section, I discuss how I utilize cross-state variation
in voting laws to isolate the causal effect of runoff elections.
2.1.2 Theoretical Motivation
Duverger’s Law and Duverger’s Hypothesis, first laid out in his 1954 book Political Parties,
says that plurality voting structures will give rise to two-party (or two-candidate) systems,
while runoff elections favor “multipartism, or outcomes with more than two candidates
receiving votes. One of the primary mechanisms through which these two voting structures
give rise to different numbers of candidates is through strategic voting. If voters behave
strategically, their votes will be determined not only by their preferences, but also by
how their votes could affect an election outcome. Sincere voters will always vote for their
most preferred candidate; strategic voters could vote for a candidate other than their most
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preferred, if doing so would lead, in expectation, to a preferable outcome.
Runoff and plurality elections would not result indifferent actions by sincere voters,
given an identical set of candidates. However, strategic voters may react differently to the
two systems. Take the following example: in a setting with mandatory voting, there are
three potential candidates A, B, and C. Voters vary in their type. Voters are type α with
probability .3, type β with probability .3, and type γ with probability .4. Types α and
β represent a split majority (for type α, [A  B  C], while for β, [B  A  C]). Type
γ is therefore the minority [C  A ∼ B]. In a plurality election, where the winner is the
candidate with the highest vote share, sincere voting results in the election of candidate C,
who is both a Condorcet loser and the candidate least preferred by .6 of voters. Therefore,
supporters of candidates A and B have strong incentives to rally around one of the two
majority candidates; this would lead to the abandonment of either candidate A or B, as a
way to avoid the election of C. Additionally, candidate A or B, anticipating such strategic
abandonment, may choose to exit the election entirely.
Compare this setting to that of a two-round election with a runoff threshold of .5, where
a runoff is triggered if no candidate receives a majority of the votes in the first round. With
mandatory participation, voters know that candidate C would lose in a runoff to either
candidate A or B; also, because candidate C does not have majority support, there is no
risk of candidate C winning in the first round. In this setting, consider the incentives
of a voter whose most preferred candidate is A. Suppose the voter does not know the
underlying support of the candidates. If the voter votes for A, he believes he could be the
pivotal voter in one of the following ways: he could give candidate A a first-round majority,
giving candidate A an immediate victory with not runoff; he could move A into the second
place position, thus putting candidate A in a runoff with either B or C; if B or C were
close to the 50 percent threshold, the voter could push them into a runoff by not voting for
them, without changing the identity of the second place candidate. In any of these cases,
the voter is either indifferent between the two outcomes (as in the case where the voter
pushes candidate B into a runoff with C, where the final outcome is unchanged), or he is
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are strictly better off (as in the case where he is the pivotal voter pushing A into second
place, and therefore into a runoff with either B or C).
Now consider the same voter in the plurality case: a voter may vote for B (even if A is
her favorite candidate) to keep from being part of a split majority that would ensure C a
first-round victory. With the existence of the runoff threshold, however, and because C is
the least favored candidate by 60 percent of voters, there is no chance that C can win in
the first round. Also, with mandatory voting, C will lose in the second round to either A
or B. With the threat of a candidate C victory eliminated, the voter will only be pivotal
in determining the candidate to which C will lose. Therefore, the candidate will have no
incentive to strategically vote for B in a two-round election.
Theoretical models often assume often find that plurality elections feature equilibria
with only two candidates, while runoff elections feature equilibria of three or more candi-
dates. Therefore, one hypothesis is that runoff elections will feature more elections with
three or more candidates. However, if voters are not fully rational, or are in practice unable
to perfectly identify the top two candidates, the runoff election may not have a noticeable
effect on the number of candidates receiving votes. All candidates in elections, even if they
have been abandoned by most of their supporters, will receive at least one vote (their own).
Therefore, a more realistic measure to use in this setting may be the cumulative vote share
of candidates finishing outside the top two. If voters behave strategically, I would expect
them to abandon all but the expected top two candidates. Even if voters cannot perfectly
identify those candidates, their strategic behavior would lead to a reduction in the support
for candidates outside the top two.
2.2 Data
I acquired primary election returns from the Secretaries of State for Florida, Georgia,
Texas, Arkansas, Kansas, New Hampshire, Idaho, and South Dakota, for the years 1992-
2012. Each observation is a party primary, and includes data on the number of candidates,
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the vote shares of each candidate, seat characteristics, and whether or not an incumbent
is participating in the primary. The choice of states is due primarily to data availability.
Primary election returns for all elections are unavailable or difficult to compile for many
states. Other states, (California, Alaska, Washington, Louisiana, Maryland), were un-
suitable for comparison, because they elect some representatives using multi-seat districts
(Maryland) or failed to conduct party-specific primaries at some time during my sample
(California, Alaska, Washington, and Louisiana have all used Blanket Primaries at some
point in my sample period). Of the eight states in my sample, four (Kansas, Idaho, New
Hampshire, and South Dakota) use plurality voting to determine party nominees, while
three (Arkansas, Georgia, Texas) use majority runoff elections. Only Florida changed its
system at any point in my sample.
Seats included in this analysis include those for the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate, Governor and Cabinet (such as Attorney General or Secretary of
State), as well as each state’s respective house of representatives and senate. This allows
me to compare the effect of the elimination of runoff elections across a variety of seat
types. Excluded from the analysis are all uncontested primaries, those with either one or
zero candidates, several states in the analysis fail to provide information on uncontested
seats. Eliminating such races will not affect my results, as runoffs and plurality elections
behave identically in races with fewer than two candidates: voters cannot vote strategically
in uncontested races, and runoffs cannot draw a second candidate into a race because a
two-candidate election under runoff and plurality systems behaves identically).
Although Florida’s switch from runoff to plurality elections can be defended as exoge-
nous to the outcome variables considered here, the 2000 election led to larger changes in
election laws that threaten the proposed identification strategy. Specifically, the Florida
legislature, as part of the bill that eliminated the runoff election, introduced no-excuse
absentee voting and provisional voting. No excuse absentee voting strips voting officials of
the ability to deny any application from a registered voter to apply for an absentee bal-
lot; thus any registered voter can vote absentee without providing an excuse. Provisional
50
voting allows voters to cast provisional ballots, meaning that even if a voter arriving at a
polling location is not on the electoral roll, she is still allowed to cast a ballot. Election
officials will later investigate and verify the provisional ballot if the voter is found to be
registered in the state. In the presence of redistricting, polling locations for people who
have not moved between election cycles can often change.
No-excuse absentee ballots and provisional voting can have an effect on observed voter
or even candidate behavior. If the preferences of voters most affected by these law changes
are not representative of the electorate as a whole (and there is little reason to suspect
that they would be), then these law changes will lead to biased estimates if not accounted
for. Fortunately, several other states introduced similar measures between 2000 and 2002.
The Help America Vote Act, passed in 2002, requires all states to allow provisional voting.
Therefore, all states without provisional voting in 2002 were, like Florida, required to begin
accepting provisional ballots. Using data compiled by the National Conference of State
Legislatures, I identified all law changes for states in my sample concerning either no-excuse
absentee ballots or provisional voting. Of the states in my analysis, Arkansas, Georgia,
Kansas, and Texas also introduced provisional voting in 2002. Additionally, several other
states in the comparison group (Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, South Dakota) passed laws
allowing no-excuse absentee voting. These law changes allow me to use this state and
temporal variation in laws to disentangle the effects of these law changes and isolate only
the effect of the changes in voting procedure.
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the two subsets of data used for this
paper. Due to reported complications in the 2002 elections (in Florida and elsewhere) in
implementing some of the changes introduced through both the Florida legislation and the
Help America Vote Act, I have removed 2002 from the sample4. 58% of contested primaries
in the sample are Republican, likely due to the relative strength of the party in several of
the states used in this sample. Stronger parties are more likely to have contested elections
because success in the general election is more likely. State House of Representative seats
4The results I find are robust to including 2002 data
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make up more than half of the data set. Approximately one-third of the races in the
sample have an incumbent participating, about one-third are candidates attempting to be
elected into an open seat, and about one-third are neither (primary elections for challengers
to incumbents in the general election). The total number of candidates participating in
contested elections ranges from two to twelve, with an average of 2.5.
Table 2.2 provides the same summary statistics for seats races with at least three
candidates. Of the 3,795 contested elections, slightly less than one-third (1,240) had three
candidates or more. Comparisons of Tables 2.1 an 2.2 demonstrate how the characteristics
of my sample change when I narrow the focus to larger elections. Larger elections in terms of
candidates are also larger in terms of votes, which is at least partially explained by a change
in the distribution of elections across governing bodies. Large, statewide seats (Senate and
Governor or cabinet positions) are more likely to have three or more candidates; although
the two categories combined make up only six percent of the full sample, they make up
over 10 percent of the sample of races with three or more candidates. As expected, such
elections are less likely to include an incumbent, as the presence of an incumbent tends to
discourage entry by other candidates. Likewise, open seats are more likely than races with
incumbents to attract large fields of candidates. Finally, 65% of elections in this sample
take place in states with runoff primary elections. This is a significantly larger share than
in the larger sample, indicating that states with runoff primaries are more likely to feature
elections with three or more candidates.
2.3 Econometric Framework
Because the variation in election systems studied in this paper is due to a change in election
policy by one state, I use a differences-in-differences design to control for the potential en-
dogeneity between runoff elections and candidate behavior. In the case of runoff elections,
there is reason to suspect that different ex ante, state-specific political environments mo-
tivated state legislatures decisions to conduct primary elections using either a plurality or
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runoff system. For instance, it may be the case that runoff elections were only implemented
in states with many factions within a party. Therefore, we would see a correlation between
runoff elections and many parties, but not due to a causal relationship.
By employing differences-in-differences, however, I can control not only for such state-
specific effects as those mentioned above, but also for time-specific effects. Specifically, each
outcome variable Yist for election i in state s at time t, can be described in the following
equation:
Yist = α+ βROst + ηXist + µZst + γs + Postt + εist
where X is a vector of election-specific covariates; Z captures state-time specific vari-
ables (specifically , the existence of no-excuse absentee ballots and provisional voting pro-
cedures); γ captures a time-invariant state factors; Postt is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the election took place after the law change, and 0 otherwise. RO is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the election was held under a runoff system, and 0 if it was held under a
plurality system. With the state fixed effects and Post-treatment dummy,the coefficient
β is the differences-in-differences estimator, capturing the causal effect of conducting an
election under a runoff system on my outcome variables. As runoff election laws vary only
at the state level, I cluster the standard errors for all regressions at the state level.
I test two different outcome variables, both of which are based on Duverger’s Law. The
first is the number of candidates entering an election. Under Duverger’s hypothesis, runoff
elections provide increased incentives for voters to vote sincerely, which results in equilibria
where more than 2 candidates receive a positive share of votes. If the elimination of the
runoff election in Florida causes voters to strategically abandon candidates, affected can-
didates may exit the election, and I would observe a decrease in the number of candidates
participating in contested elections.
The second test focuses directly on the behavior of voters, using as the outcome variable
appropriate outcome variable the total vote share of all candidates finishing behind the
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top two candidates in elections. Under Duverger’s Law, I would expect this variable to
be higher, reflecting voters’ increased incentives to vote for their most preferred among all
candidates, instead of their most preferred of the top two candidates.
The effect voting procedure on voter behavior can only be measured if the number
of candidates is unaffected. If the elimination of runoff elections causes candidates to exit
elections they would otherwise enter, it becomes impossible to measure the effect of the law
directly on voter behavior, because voters would be voting over a different set of candidates.
2.4 Results
I first consider the effect of runoff elections on the number of candidates entering an election.
In this regression, the seat-specific co-variates used are dummies for whether a race includes
an incumbent, is an open seat, and a dummy indicating the government body (state house,
Unites States House, etc) in which the seat is located. The number of candidates entering
an election can affect the distribution of votes, so testing for the effect of runoff elections
on the number of candidates is necessary before moving on to estimating the causal effect
of runoff elections on voter behavior. Only if candidate entry is truly unaffected by the
existence of a runoff can I test directly for strategic voting.
Column 1 of Table 2.3 reports the results for a linear regression of the causal effect of a
runoff on the number of candidates. Under this specification, runoff elections are associated
with 0.07 fewer candidates, but this estimate is far from statistically significant. These re-
sults fail to indicate any causal effect of runoff elections on the number of candidates. Each
of the statistically significant coefficients is of the expected sign. Races with incumbents
have fewer candidates, while races for open seats attract more candidates. Compared to
statewide seats for the Governor’s office and cabinet seats, which is the omitted category,
races for state house and senate seats attract fewer candidates, while Unites States Senate
seats attract significantly more candidates. This is likely due to the attractiveness of the
different seats.
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However, a linear regression may suffer from unnecessary noise. Because Duverger’s
Law predicts that plurality elections will result in two-candidate equilibrium, while runoff
elections result in equilibria of at least three candidates, the only relevant margin is the
one between two and three candidates. Therefore, I perform a similar test to the one
reported in Column 2 of Table 2.3; however, this time I use a logit regression, using as
the dependent variable a dummy equal to 1 if a race has more than three candidates, and
equal to 0 otherwise. Under this alternative specification, the results are unchanged; runoff
elections do not appear to cause an increase in the number of candidates.
The elimination of runoff elections appears to have had no effect on the entry and exit
decisions of candidates. However, under Duverger’s Law, this is only a second-order effect.
Candidates will only leave races if they anticipate abandonment by their supporters, who
will rally strategically behind their most preferred of the top two candidates in plurality
elections. It may be implausible to assume that candidates can perfectly anticipate if they
will be the victim of such abandonment (as opposed to the beneficiary). Additionally, since
the sample here consists of primary elections, the information that candidates have when
they are deciding to enter or exit a campaign may be relatively limited. Finally, even if a
candidate exits a campaign shortly before the election, her name will still appear on the
ballot. In this case, the candidate exit would not appear in the data as one fewer candidate
in the race, because she would almost certainly garner a few votes.
Therefore, I can now directly test for strategic voting behavior. In this case, the depen-
dent variable is the cumulative vote share in the first round of elections for all candidates
finishing third or lower. If voters in runoff elections are less likely to strategically vote for
one of the top two candidates, I would expect the vote share for candidates finishing third
or lower to be, on average, higher in runoffs. The specification for this second reduced
form model is identical to those used in the previous specifications, with the following
adjustments: my sample is restricted to races with three or more candidates, since these
are the only races in which vote shares for candidates finishing third or lower are observed;
additionally, the number of candidates is included as a race-level variable.
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Table 2.4 shows the standard 2-by-2 table, comparing pre- and post-treatment averages
for Florida to comparison states, which provides a preview of my findings. Vote share
for candidates finishing outside the top two is lower in the post-treatment periods for
both groups in all five types of elections considered. However, in four of the five cases,
the average dropped by a greater amount in Florida than in comparison states. These
results are consistent with Duverger’s Law. When participating in plurality election (as
was instituted in Florida after 2001), voters are less likely to voter for candidates outside
the top two, and are likewise more likely to vote for one of the top two candidates.
Results for the regression using cumulative vote share for candidates finishing outside
the top two is reported in Table 2.5. While no effect was observed of runoff elections on
the number of candidates, the results support the hypothesis that voters in runoff elections
are less likely to vote strategically. As compared to plurality elections, vote shares for
candidates finishing outside the top two in runoffs is 1.73 percentage points higher with
the estimates statistically significant at the 5% level. Given the baseline of 22.55 vote share
for such candidates, this represents a 10 percent increase in the vote share. This finding is
significantly smaller than those found by Fujiwara (2011), who found that runoff elections
led to a 50 percent increase in vote share. Similarly, Bordignon and Tabellinin (2009)
found a large effect of runoff elections in their study, with a 30% increase in the number
of candidates and 50% increase in the number of parties when moving from a plurality to
runoff election. Also, as shown in Appendix B.1, the statistical significance of the results
shown in Table 2.5 is not robust to more conservative estimates of estimation.
There is significant variation in the causal effects across different types of elections. I
compare the effect of runoff elections in statewide elections (United States Senate, Governor
and cabinet seats), to the effect in smaller, regional elections (state house, state senate, and
United States House). There are reasons to suspect that these races behave differently. All
else equal, statewide elections attract more candidates; 37.9 percent of contested statewide
elections featured three or more candidates, as opposed to just 30.7 percent of contested
regional elections. Voters in larger elections may be better informed about candidates other
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than their most preferred, as these elections receive more media coverage. Therefore, voters
may be better able to identify the top two candidates, and determine their most preferred
among the top two candidates. Finally, voter turnout in the second round of runoff elections
is higher in statewide elections than in regional elections. As I will demonstrate in the last
part of this paper, this difference in voter turnout can influence the types of equilibria in
terms of strategic voting and the number of candidates.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.5 separate the results of column 1 into local and statewide
elections, respectively. While voters participating in the first stage of a runoff election in
regional elections increase their support of candidates finishing third or lower by only 1.59
percentage points, voters in statewide elections increase their support of similar candidates
by 11 percent. The baseline of both of these groups is around 22.5 percent, so these
differences in treatment effects are not being driven by differences in the baseline. There
is reason to suspect that voters in larger elections may be more likely to vote strategically.
When compared to the findings of other studies, the effects found in the results above
are quite small. This could be due to the differences in the settings (American primaries
as opposed to Brazilian or Italian general elections) or to differences in participation rates
between the two settings. Voting is mandatory in Brazil, and it sees turnout rates of close
to 90 percent. While voting is not mandatory in Italy, participation rates are higher in
national elections than corresponding participation rates in the United States.
Voter turnout (and, specifically, relative participation rates between election rounds)
is of unique importance in this setting, due to the impact it can have on the equilibrium
number of candidates, as well as on the behavior of voters. Recent theoretical models
(Callander (2005), Bouton (2013)) have illustrated the conditions under which runoff elec-
tions can feature two-candidate equilibria. As Bouton (2013) has shown, runoff elections
can feature two-candidate equilibrium when the populations between the two rounds of
the runoffs differ. The intuition is as follows: if voters do not know which voters will
participate in the runoff, they face the possibility of a non-majority candidate winning a
runoff, even if he was the Condorcet loser in the first round. When the populations of
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voters in the two rounds are identical, it would be impossible for a Condorcet loser to win
in the second round of an election. With low turnout, a two-candidate equilibrium can
exist where voters abandon all but two candidates, abandoning those who they believe have
no chance of winning in the first round, in order to avoid an upset victory in the second
round. If candidates are rational and anticipate this abandonment, only two candidates
will enter the race. This would mean that voters can still be strategic and behave similarly
in runoff and plurality elections.
In 2000, the final year of runoff elections, voter turnout in the 20 runoff elections held
in Florida was, on average, 69.9 percent of the turnout in the first round of elections. Using
this turnout rate, it is easy to imagine an example where a Condorcet loser is elected with a
runoff. Suppose that Candidate A is a Condorcet loser and receives 45 percent of first round
votes, with a split majority divided between Candidate B (30 percent) and Candidates C
(25 percent). In a runoff with full participation, Candidates A and B advance to a runoff
, and Candidate B wins with 55 percent of the vote. First round majority voters can
vote sincerely for their preferred candidate (between B and C), knowing that the winner
between those two will win in the second round.
Suppose now that, instead of all voters participating in the runoff election, only 70
percent, participate. Suppose that 80 percent of those who voted for Candidates A or B
participate in the 2nd round, while only 40 percent of those who voted for an eliminated
candidate participate. Even if all Candidate C supporters participating in the runoff vote
for Candidate B, Candidate A would win the runoff with 51.4 percent of the vote. If voters
anticipate the possibility of this outcome, they have an incentive to rally behind their
favorite of the top two candidates (in this case, Candidate C supporters would abandon
him in favor of candidate B). Note that these results are identical to the results we would
predict in a plurality election.
Testing this theory directly is not possible, since runoff voter turnout is not observed
when only two candidates enter the race (as no runoff will be held). Also, the behavior
of individual voters in both rounds of elections is not observable. Instead, I construct a
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variable of voter participation to determine whether potential candidates anticipating lower
runoff election turnout respond by abandoning races. Using the State Legislative Election
Returns, 1967-2003 dataset, compiled by Carsey et al. (2008), I restrict my sample to
primary elections held seven states5, between 1968 and 19886. I then use a fixed effects
model to test the hypothesis that larger changes in voting populations between the first
and second round of voting leads to a smaller number of candidates entering a race.
If the equilibrium number of candidates is more likely to be two when the uncertainty
over voting populations between the two rounds is greater, I would expect to see large
changes in the turnout between the first two stages of a runoff election to discourage
candidate entry. Using the data on southern primary elections, I use as the primary
independent variable a lagged term for the change in turnout between the two rounds,
taken from the previous election. However, most elections do not go to runoffs, and thus
candidates in the next election cannot observe what the change in population would have
been. Therefore, I use the average change in voter turnout over the entire legislative body
(House or Senate) for the previous election cycle as the primary independent variable. The
claim here is that candidates and voters can observe and respond to changes in participation
rates in the previous election when making their decisions in the current election.
To construct this variable measured the absolute value of the percentage change between
the turnout for each of the two rounds of runoff elections:
Difference =
∣∣∣∣100− TurnoutRound2TurnoutRound1 ∗ 100
∣∣∣∣
If the turnout is identical between the two rounds, this value is equal to 0; if the turnout
in the second round is 99 or 101 percent of the turnout in the first round, this value is
equal to 1, and so on. This measurement therefore provides a monotonic measurement
of the degree to which the turnout between the two rounds changes. This is the most
5Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas
6North & South Carolina data is not included (though both states conduct primary runoffs), and the
data set does not include primary elections after 1988.
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conservative estimate for the change in population; the implicit assumption is that everyone
who participates in the lower-turnout round participates in both rounds. In reality, some
people only participate in one of the two rounds. For each state, year and body of legislature
(House or Senate) I constructed a mean of this variable for each year. To estimate the effect
of this variable on future behavior of candidates, I used the following model:
Candidatesist = γs + δt + µ ∗ Partyist + ψ ∗Bodyist + β ∗Differenceis,t−1 + εist
where Candidatesist is the number of candidates in election i in state s, year t. γs and
δt are state and year fixed effects. Partyist is a set of dummy variables for each party.
Bodyist is a set of dummy variables indicating if the election was for a seat in the House
of Representatives or Senate. Differenceis,t−1 is the average of the change in turnout in
the body of government in the election immediately before. Both the year and state fixed
effects are important to note, as they both time invariant state fixed effects and common
time shocks across all states.
As before, I cannot look at the behavior of voters without first considering if fluctuations
in turnout affect the entry and exit decisions of candidates. The hypothesis is that election
participants (voters or candidates) will use information about the most recent election
when making entry decisions in the current election. Specifically, I will test whether larger
variation between the two rounds leads to a smaller number of candidates entering elections,
or to a higher likelihood of a two-candidate equilibrium. As before, I use two different
outcome variables to measure the number of candidates: the number of candidates itself,
and a dummy variable equal to 1 if there are three or more candidates, and equal to 0
otherwise. Because the relevant margin is two to three candidates, this variable provides a
simpler measure. If larger differences in turnout between the two rounds results in a two-
candidate equilibrium, we would expect β, the coefficient on Difference, to be negative
in both regressions
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Table 2.6 shows the results of regressions for both measures of the number of candidates.
For each of the variables, I test the hypothesis using both a logit and linear model. In
every case, I only consider contested elections (elections with at least two candidates).
When using the number of candidates as the dependent variable, I see a slightly negative,
statistically insignificant coefficient. However, when the dependent variable is a dummy
indicating if there were three or more candidates, we see a statistically significant (at the
10% level) negative effect for both the logit and linear model, indicating that candidates
are less likely to enter races when fluctuations in turnout were high in the previous election.
A 1% increase in the turnout variation in the previous election leads to a decrease of 0.09%
to 0.37% in the likelihood of a competitive election featuring a third candidate.
The claim that these changes in voter turnout in one election could change the entry
decisions of candidates in the following election may seem far-fetched. However, it is
not the change in a population itself, but the increased chance of an upset victory that
would affect the behavior of participants. Such upsets are likely to be well-publicized.
One example of an upset victory in a runoff election is the Democratic primary in the
2010 Arkansas Senate election. Blanche Lincoln, the incumbent, was widely expected to
lose the Democratic nomination. Although Bill Halter, the challenger, was leading her in
polls taken leading up to the runoff election, Lincoln won a shocking victory. However,
of the state’s 1.5 million registered Democrats, fewer than 260,000 of them voted in the
Democratic primary runoff, and Halter received 15,000 fewer votes than he did in the first
round of the election. The primary result proved to have a negative impact on Democratic
fortunes in the state. In the general election, Lincoln lost by more than 20 percentage
points, and became the first Democratic Senate nominee in 138 years to lose a general
election in Arkansas.
These results indicate that candidates are less likely to enter an election when larger
variations in turnout were experienced between the two rounds of election in the prior
election year. These findings provide evidence that the strategy of voters in Florida before
the elimination of the runoff may have already been similar to those employed in plurality
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elections, as turnout was very low in both rounds (between 20 and 30 percent of all voter
eligible to vote in primaries), and changed significantly between the two rounds. To rec-
oncile the findings here with those in other settings, the different estimates of causal effect
may not be due to different fractions of strategic voters, but instead to voters responding
to different political settings. Additionally, these results indicate that policy decisions con-
cerning runoff elections should take into account the political setting, as efficiency gains
from runoff elections could vary significantly.
2.5 Conclusion
One argument in favor of the use of runoff elections is that it encourages voters to vote
sincerely, and therefore creates an voting system that will more likely reflect voters’ true
preferences. Duverger’s Hypothesis provides a clear, testable prediction of the effect of
runoff and plurality elections on the number of supportable candidates. Empirical tests of
this theory under different setting have largely supported the claim that voters often vote
strategically, and that runoff elections feature either more candidates, or greater support
for candidates outside the top two. Utilizing the elimination of the state of Florida’s runoff
election in primary elections, I test for the effect of runoff elections on the behavior of
voters and candidates.
This setting offers two important differences from previous work. First, primary elec-
tions feature only candidates from the same party. Therefore, I can measure the impact
of runoff elections on strategic voting only, instead of the effect of runoffs on the estab-
lishment of legitimate third parties. Second, the low turnout in primary election provides
a very different setting than those used in previous research. Voters may face different
incentives to vote strategically in low-turnout elections, and the effect of runoff elections
could likewise differ.
I find that, after the elimination of runoff elections, voters became less likely to vote
for candidates finishing third or worse in the first round of primary elections. This finding
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supports the hypothesis that voters in plurality elections employ different strategies from
those in runoff elections. However, the magnitude of the estimates I obtain are significantly
smaller than those found in previous research.
One possible explanation for this difference can be found in the low voter turnouts in
American primary elections. With low turnouts in both rounds of a two-round election,
a candidate who is the Condorcet loser can beat a second-round opponent. To test this
hypothesis, I investigate how changes in voter turnout in one election affect outcomes in
the next. I find that third candidates are less likely to enter an election when large changes
in turnout occurred in the previous election, which supports the models of strategic voting
in runoffs with uncertainty over the voting population.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: All Contested Elections
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Republican (=1) 0.588 0.491 0 1
Runoff State(=1) 0.562 0.496 0 1
Open (=1) 0.388 0.487 0 1
Incumbent Race(=1) 0.344 0.475 0 1
Total Votes 42,217 148,681 122 2298880
Candidates 2.55 1.036 2 12
Type of Election
Governor 0.051 0.206 0 1
State House 0.621 0.486 0 1
State Senate 0.185 0.389 0 1
US House 0.128 0.341 0 1
US Senate 0.016 0.126 0 1
N=3,795
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: At Least 3 Candidates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Republican (=1) 0.578 0.495 0 1
Runoff State(=1) 0.623 0.477 0 1
Open (=1) 0.524 0.5 0 1
Incumbent Race(=1) 0.192 0.397 0 1
Total Votes 70,902 207,983 396 2298880
Candidates 3.68 1.174 3 12
Vote Share (Top Two) 77.50 11.42 38.46 100
Type of Election
Governor 0.080 0.257 0 1
State House 0.553 0.497 0 1
State Senate 0.157 0.363 0 1
US House 0.180 0.39 0 1
US Senate 0.030 0.176 0 1
N=1,240
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Table 2.3: Number of Candidates Entering Races
(1) (2)
Linear Logit
Runoff -0.079 -0.164
(0.135) (0.417)
Republican -0.000971 -0.0351
(0.0677) (0.131)
Incumbent Involvement -0.470∗∗ -1.178∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.0794)
State House -0.513∗∗ -0.713∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.0794)
State Senate -0.527∗∗∗ -0.719∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.237)
U.S. House -0.040 -0.187*
(0.106) (0.096)
U.S. Senate 0.554* 0.676
(0.251) (0.453)
Observations 3,795 3,795
R2 0.124 .
Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.
State Level Controls include dummies for no-excuse absentee voting
and provisional ballot laws
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Pre and Post-Treatment Averages
Average cumulative vote share of candidates
finishing third or worse
Pre-2001 Post-2001 Diff
Governor & Cabinet
Florida 19.37 13.36 -6.01
Other States 24.4 24.33 -0.07
Difference -5.03 -10.98 -5.94
State House of Rep.
Florida 24.47 22.66 -1.81
Other States 22.34 21.64 -0.7
Difference +2.15 +1.02 -1.1
State Senate
Florida 24.51 17.96 -6.55
Other States 23.66 19.20 -4.46
Difference +0.85 -1.24 -2.09
U.S. House
Florida 25.32 24.91 -0.41
Other States 23.86 22.32 -1.54
Difference +1.46 +2.59 +1.13
U.S. Senate
Florida 22.82 16.06 -6.76
Other States 23.84 20.29 -3.55
Difference -1.02 -4.23 -3.21
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Table 2.5: Dependent Variable: Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
All Elections Local Statewide
Runoff 1.732∗∗ 1.591 10.994***
(0.689) (0.924) (2.683)
Num. of Candidates 6.057∗∗∗ 6.51*** 3.840***
(0.540) (0.695) (0.960)
Republican 0.319 0.335 -0.211
(1.003) (0.900) (2.262)
Incumbent Involvement -4.861∗∗∗ -5.084*** -0.640
(0.979) (1.135) (2.531)
State House 3.147∗∗ - -
(0.581)
State Senate 1.823 -1.82 -
(1.10) (1.029)
U.S. House -0.446 -3.064*** -
(1.112) (0.746)
U.S. Senate -5.707*** - -4.692*
(2.101) (2.340)
N 1,240 1,104 136
R2 0.430 0.460 0.375
Mean of Dep. Var 22.5 22.513 22.40
Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. State Level
Controls include dummies for no-excuse absentee voting and provisional ballot laws
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.6: Number of Candidates Entering Races
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Linear Logit Linear Logit
Difference -0.00156 -0.00305 -0.000901* -0.00372*
(0.00151) (0.00229) (0.000456) (0.00194)
Democrat 0.312*** 0.522*** 0.106*** 0.441***
(0.0333) (0.0648) (0.0237) (0.104)
House of Rep. 0.0697 0.116 0.0177 0.0743
(0.0583) (0.0983) (0.0245) (0.104)
Observations 4,794 4,794 4,794 4,794
R-squared 0.046 0.033
Dependent Var Candidates Candidates >2 Dummy >2 Dummy
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 3
What We Talk About When We Talk About
Campaign Spending
3.1 Introduction
The role of campaign spending in elections has been a focal point of both empirical research
and policy discussions for decades. Several well-publicized court decisions and recent leg-
islative actions have kept campaign finance in the forefront of public debate. However,
despite a large body of research on the topic, research has failed to reach a consensus on
the causal effect of spending. Much of this research, especially studies of United States
elections, has relied on summaries of total candidate disbursements to measure candidate
spending, instead of finer measurements that could yield more fruitful results.
This paper has two primary goals, both of which are made possible through newly
available data. First, by utilizing new questions asked on in the 2012 American National
Election Study (ANES), I can track changes in individuals’ preferences for candidates
during a single election cycle. This allows me to control for unobserved campaign and indi-
vidual characteristics and estimate the causal effect of candidate spending under relatively
weak identifying assumptions. Second, the Federal Election Commission’s digitization of
transaction-level data of candidate spending make it possible to identify different types of
candidate disbursements and track daily spending throughout the campaign, which allows
me to isolate spending that is likely to be used to sway voter opinion from other types of
candidate disbursements.
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Much of the existing research on the role of campaign spending on voter behavior has
relied on summaries of total candidate disbursement as the independent variable of interest.
The implicit assumption is that all candidate disbursement is being used in similar ways in
raising a candidate’s vote share. However, political campaigns are complex, and money can
achieve many goals, not all of which are used to sway the opinions of voters. Incumbents
maintain campaign offices between elections and engage in fund-raising efforts to build
war chests during elections years when they are relatively unchallenged. If only some
money is being used to persuade voters, then estimates of that effect using all spending
as the independent variable could be biased. Unfortunately, total candidate disbursement
is not only the most obvious measurements to use, but is often the only one available to
researchers.
One primary motivation of this paper is to try and resolve a paradox between the
finding of previous research and observed behavior of candidates. Empirical research on
elections has consistently questioned the effectiveness of campaign spending, with many
studies finding small or insignificant estimates of causal effect. However, spending by
candidates has continually increased in United States elections. Since 1990, spending by
the average winner of House elections has increased by 112%, in real terms, while real
spending by Senate election winners increased by 79%. This raises an obvious question: if
campaign spending is useless, why are candidates continuing to increase their spending?
This paper makes three primary contributions. First, I find that campaign spending
is effective in swaying voter opinion, even late in an election cycle, when many voter
decisions have already been made. Second, I find that these estimates of causal effect are
strongest, and most precisely estimated, when campaign spending is measured only using
types of spending that are likely used to sway voter opinion. Finally, turning to the relative
effectiveness of challenger and incumbent spending, I find that systematic differences in the
way challengers and incumbents spend their fund could be driving previous results that have
frequently found challenger spending to be more effective than spending by incumbents.
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3.1.1 Previous Literature
This paper builds on an extensive literature on campaign spending. Models of campaign
spending have explored how candidates may influence election outcomes, and have primar-
ily hypothesized that messages sent from candidates to voters operate as the important
mechanism. Several models (Austen-Smith (1987), Baily (2002), Barron (1994)) describe
the function of candidate spending as a way of informing voters of candidates true pol-
icy position. In others (Coate (2004)), candidates use spending to inform voters about
their quality. However, only a portion of candidate disbursements go towards creating and
sending these signals to voters. As I will show later, systematic differences are present
in the way different candidates spend their money particularly between challengers and
incumbents. Therefore, one primary goal of this paper will be to provide a more specific
measurement of candidate spending on “signals”, and measure its causal effect.
Although empirical research has frequently addressed the impact of campaign spending,
little consensus has been reached. While some studies (Goldstein and Freedman (2000),
Gerber (1998)) have found large effects of campaign spending on candidate success, others
(Levitt (1994), Welch (1981)) have found small or insignificant effects of spending.
A great of the empirical work on the subject has focused on the surprising result that
spending by incumbents appears to be less effective than spending by challengers. Jacobson
(1978) first noted this phenomenon, and attributed it to reactive spending by incumbents.
Incumbents are only likely to spend more if when they face high quality competition, in
which case they will receive lower vote share. However, this finding has been supported by
a great deal of research in both United States (Gerber (2004), Levitt (1994), Abramowitz
(1988)) and international elections(Pattie et al. (1995), Benoit (2010)), though a variety of
papers studying a number of settings (Gerber (1998), Erickson and Palfrey (1998)) have
challenged these conclusions, claiming that incumbent and challenger spending are equally
effective. While this focus by researchers on this phenomenon has at times seemed little
more than a statistical puzzle, the desire to resolve this puzzle is understandable. I show
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that when total disbursements are used to measure candidate spending, I find incumbent
spending to be less effective than challenger spending. However, when I use only spending
by candidates on communication to voters, challenger and incumbent spending appears to
be equally effective.
A strength of my estimation strategy is the ability to use individual-level data, which
allows me to compare changes in voter preferences within a single election, instead of
relying on cross-election variation to estimate causal effects. While most studies of the
effect of campaign spending have relied on cross-election variation, several papers have
utilized individual-level data. Jacobson (1990) uses a panel survey data taken during the
1986 elections measures the effect of candidate spending on changes in voter preferences
during the last weeks of the campaign, finding that challenger spending has a larger effect
on voter preferences. Goldstein and Freedman (2000) combine data on advertising exposure
with the 1996 ANES, and find that, not only is candidate spending on advertising largely
effective, but that challenger and incumbent spending on advertising is equally effective.
The claim that I make in this paper is that these results are not necessarily inconsistent
with those that find that total challenger spending is more effective that total incumbent
spending, but that they result from systematic differences in the way the two types of
candidates allocate financial resources.
To my knowledge, only one paper, Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994), has specifically
addressed the issues that might arise from using aggregate spending data as a measure
of candidate spending. Using a fully itemized dataset of 1990 Congressional election can-
didates, the authors compare estimates of causal effect under three different measures of
campaign spending. The most restrictive measure of spending the call “communications”,
which is advertising, direct voter contact, phone banks, and campaign rallies. The authors
find this more precise measure of campaign spending, when used as the right-hand side
variable in a simple OLS regression of spending on vote share, instead of eliminating the
negative correlation between incumbent spending and vote share, leads to a larger gap in
the effect of challenger and incumbent spending. This result is not surprising, as advertis-
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ing spending is certainly reactive spending: only candidates in competitive elections will
spend money in advertising. The paper also highlights the fact that a precise measure of
campaign spending does not resolve the underlying endogeneity issues plaguing estimates
of causal effect.
3.2 Empirical Framework
The ANES time-series survey has been conducted every Presidential election year since
1948, and every Congressional election year since 1958. The survey gathers information
on voter opinion before the general election, and on the ultimate voting behavior of those
same individuals after the election. The pre-election survey typically asks voters about
their intent to vote in the presidential election, but has only once before (in 1996) asked
voters how they intend to vote in Congressional elections. The structure of the 2012 ANES
time-series survey allows me to investigate the effect of late-election cycle spending on
changes in voter preferences. By using variation in the timing of campaign spending, I can
test if changes in the relative spending by candidates predicts changes in preferences by
individuals.
With only two major participants in an election, individuals have the option of voting
for either of the two parties, voting for a minor party, or abstaining. This decision can
be converted into a single linear variable by considering votes received by the Republican
candidate, net the vote received by the Democratic candidate. I use as the dependent
variable the net vote for the Republican candidate, taking on a value +1 if the voter
supports the Republican candidate, -1 if she supports the Democratic candidate, and 0 if
she either votes for a minor candidate or abstains. This framework has an intuitive appeal,
as it can be easily converted to vote shares (a 0.1 increase in the net votes for a Republican
would be 5% swing in the vote share for a Republican in a 2-candidate race).
I assume that individual voter preferences can be described by the following linear
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model:
NetV otesie = φXi+β(ln(RepublicanSpending)−ln(DemocraticSpending))e+δi+ζe+ie
Where NetV otesie is the net votes of individual i in election e. This is determined by
a set of observed voter characteristics, Xie as well as spending by candidates. Spending of
candidates is determined by spending of candidates between the beginning of the general
election (as measured by the end of the primary election) and the date of the general
election. This framework assumes that all candidate spending is equally effective, and that
spending by one candidate offsets the effect of the spending by the other. Additionally,
individual voting decisions are determined by unobserved, time-invariant individual and
election characteristics characteristics, δi + ζe. Candidate quality, political climate and
unobserved voter preferences bias any measure of causal effect from this equation. Popular
candidates will be better able to raise (and therefore spend) money, and will also be
preferred by more individuals. There is no time variation in this regression, as this data
comes only from people who voted on election day, and is a purely cross-sectional look at
voter behavior and spending.
During pre-election surveys, which took place in the weeks before the general election,
potential voters were asked how they intend to vote. The pre-election preferences of voters
can be modeled as
NetV otesiet = γt+φXit+β(RepublicanSpending−DemocraticSpending)et+δi+ζe+iet
Where the dependent variable is determined by the candidate for whom the individual
states they intend to vote at time t. Potential voters were assigned a +1 if they intended to
vote for the Republican candidate, -1 if they intended to vote for the Democratic candidate,
and 0 if they did not know for whom they would vote, if they intended to vote for a different
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candidate, or intended not to vote1. Candidate spending is determined by the sum of
spending between the beginning of the general election and the date of the pre-election
survey. Since the pre-election survey was conducted over several weeks, I include time
fixed effects, γt which control for common, time-variant shocks.
By taking the difference between these two values, unobserved, time-invariant charac-
teristics across elections and voters are fully captured.
∆NetV otesit = ∆γt + ∆β(RepublicanSpending −DemocraticSpending)et + et
This framework offers an improvement over studies utilizing variation across different
elections. By observing changes in voter opinion within an election, I am able to reduce
the potential for omitted variables to lead to biased estimates of causal effect. Though the
characteristics of potential voters does not vary over time, and should therefore fall into the
error term of the differenced equation, I also include individual voter characteristics as a
robustness check. Additionally, I can utilize the variegation in the timing of the pre-election
survey to control for time shocks by including a time dummy.
The identifying assumptions of this framework are relatively weak. I only need to
assume that election fixed effects remain time invariant during a the general election cam-
paign. Specifically, the assumption implicit in this specification is that the unobserved
characteristics of individuals that affect both candidate spending and the preferences of
voters is fixed between the pre and post-election surveys. This assumption would be vio-
lated if, for instance, time-variant shocks occurred during the election cycle that affected
both the spending patterns of candidates, and the preferences of voters.
Two characteristics of this framework help address these concerns. First, the pre-
election survey took place after most of the fundraising activity for the election had taken
place. This means that even if, for example, a negative shock to candidate likability reduced
1The ANES survey asks ‘For whom does respondent intend to vote”, with a list of candidate names.
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the likelihood that a potential voter would vote for that candidate, it likely would not affect
candidate spending ability, as most funds are acquired early in the election cycle. Second,
the variation in pre-election timing allows me to control for aggregate, time-variant shocks.
Given the voter preference and behavior is determined by survey data, there is a concern
of missmeasurement and response bias. Specifically, I will cover several potential biases
in responses that have been discussed in previous research. First, it was noted that in
earlier versions of the ANES, respondents were sometimes significantly more likely to have
reported voting for incumbents. Second, there is the potential for people to claim to have
voted even when they did not, especially in face-to-face interviews (Holbrook and Krosnick
(2010)). The theory is that people face a social pressure, and claim to vote even when
they don’t. Newer versions of the survey have been redesigned to combat these sources of
bias. To these, I will address one more: winner bias. If voters are more likely to claim
having voted for the winner in the post-election survey, this could lead to biased estimates,
especially if winners end up spending more.
Even if incumbency bias existed, it would not pose a threat to my identification strategy,
as the bias would be captured by the individual fixed effect, as the identity of the incumbent
does not change throughout the election cycle. The over-reporting bias, however, could bias
my estimates, especially if people who claim to have voted are more likely to both not state
a preference in the pre-election survey, and then claim to have voted for the candidate who
spent the most on advertising and campaign events. I test for the existence of this bias by
estimating causal effect separately for respondents for whom the survey was administered
face-to-face, and those who self-administered the survey online. Previous research has
found that self-administered online surveys feature less over-reporting of voter turnout
that face-to-face surveys (Holbrook and Krosnick (2010)). To test for winner bias, I test
whether people are more likely to switch their vote for the winner in the post-election
survey. The results are presented in Appendix C.1.
In my estimates of causal effect, I use each of the three measures of candidate spending,
which are detailed in more depth in the following section: disbursements, spending, and
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communication. Also, there is a strong reason to expect heterogeneous treatment effects
of campaign spending. Not all voters are affected by campaign spending equally, and
many individuals are not going to vote no matter the messages from candidates, or have
selected their preferred candidate long before the general election. Additionally, in models
of voting behavior, the identity of the marginal voter is of utmost importance. The richness
of the American National Election Study is therefore particularly helpful in determining
the characteristics of voters who are most likely to be affected by campaign spending.
3.3 Data
Candidate spending data comes from the Federal Election Commission candidate disburse-
ment dataset, which details each individual transaction in support of a candidate of the
2012 Congressional and Senate elections. So called “memo line” transactions were dropped
from the data, as these disbursements represent double-payments (i.e. credit card pay-
ments, where the original purchase had already been itemized). One of the central goals of
this paper is to better understand different types of candidate spending, and to isolate only
those that are most likely to be used to sway voter preferences. Therefore, a discussion of
the disbursements found in the 2012 FEC Candidate Disbursement dataset is needed.
In support of the 2012 election, House and Senate candidates spend almost $2 Billion,
consisting of 722,782 disbursements. Importantly for this research, a note attached to each
transaction allows me to distinguish different types of campaign spending.
FEC filing rules separate disbursement into 12 categories2 Only 286,969 (39.7%) of
disbursements, constituting $0.775 Billion (38.9%) of spending have this filing code ex-
plicitly code provided. However, 719,017 (99.5%) of disbursements, constituting $1.977
Bill (99.3%) of spending have notes detailing the type of spending, allowing me to assign
spending codes to observations in which it is missing. The procedure used for assignment
2The categories are: 1: Administrative/Salary/Overhead Expenses; 2: Travel; 3: Fundraising; 4: Adver-
tising; 5: Polling Expenses; 6: Campaign Materials; 7: Campaign Events; 8: Transfers to other committees
of same candidate; 9: Loan Repayments; 10: Refund of Contributions; 11: Political Contributions; 12:
Donations.
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is outlined in Appendix C.2.
This data provides an in-depth view of how candidates spend their money. First, a
portion of disbursements are coded as “refunds of contributions” “contributions to other
candidates”, and “donations”. These are all disbursements that are transfers of funds out
of a campaign, instead of being used in support of a candidate, and are likely only to be
incurred if a candidate is likely to win the election3. Second, large amounts of money
are spent on polling, transfers between committee, and administrative purposes, including
rent, car leases, and staff salary. While these expenses are likely necessary for a successful
candidate, they differ in a fundamental way from spending that is being used to create
and deliver candidate messages to potential voters. Additionally, a larger portion of these
expenses are incurred long before the election, including the year before the campaign.
In order to consider how different measures of spending affect the estimates of causal
effect, I follow a framework similar to Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994). The first measure
I use is the all disbursements. This is the standard measure used in previous literature. I
call this measure “disbursements”. The second measure is all disbursements but refunds,
donations, and contributions, I call “spending”, since this is all spending that is done is
support of a candidate, regardless of its purpose. Finally, I construct a third measure of
candidate spending, which consists only of advertising and campaign events. These are
the types of spending that are used to delivery messages directly to voters, and I call this
measurement “communication”.
Though empirical papers have rarely been able to utilize different measurements of
candidate spending, this distinction was discussed by Jacobson (1978). He identified two
types of spending by candidates: spending that a candidate would incur in any setting,
determined by fixed costs, taste of spending, or wealth, and spending that depends on a
candidates election circumstances (reactive spending). My claim is similar: all candidates,
regardless of the competition that they face, spend some positive amounts of money. How-
ever, there is little reason to assume that all of this spending will be used to increase a
3This is especially the case of refunds, which are frequently labeled “refund of unneeded funds”
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candidate’s vote share.
Figure 3.1, which shows the spending of candidates who ultimately won election in the
2012 House of Representatives election4. Candidates are considered to be uncontested if
they face either no challenger in the general election, or only independent challengers who
failed to earn 5% of the vote share. Surprisingly, candidates who faced no contest in their
general election spent more than those who were in contested ones. While some of this may
have been used to deter potential challengers from entering the election in the first place,
or spending during primary elections, the continued spending during the general election
campaign should lead us to question our assumptions about the true function of campaign
spending. If the only purpose of all campaign spending were to persuade voters, it is
difficult to conceive of circumstances under which those who have no need to sway voters
spend the greatest amount of money doing so. Safe incumbents are likely to maintain large
staffs and begin building war chests to prepare for future political battles.
Figure 3.2 shows the same comparison, but only measuring spending on advertising and
campaign events, which I classify as “communications”. Though uncontested candidates
have spent more on these activities than contested candidates before the beginning of the
year, almost all of their total spending occurs before the beginning of the general election.
This early spending could be due to primary election competition or as an entry deter-
rent. Importantly, once the general election starts, spending all but ceases for uncontested
candidates. It is the use of this spending, and not of aggregate spending, that appears to
follow patterns we would expect if spending is changing voter opinion during the general
election.
The data also reveals important distinctions between the behavior of incumbents and
other candidates. Figure 3.3 shows the behavior of general election candidate spending
throughout the election cycle. By the beginning of 2012, incumbents has already spent
an average of over $500,000, and have spent significantly more than other candidates in
the months before the beginning of the general election campaign (about September 1).
4No Senate election winner were uncontested; I therefore dropped all Senate elections for this comparison
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While candidates for open seats eventually catch up in spending to incumbents, challengers
consistently spend significantly less than other candidates, spending less than half, on
average, than other candidates.
The ability for incumbents to outspend their opponents is nothing new, but the com-
position of incumbent disbursement is significantly different than that of other candidates.
As seen in Figure 3.4 incumbents spend a significantly larger amount than other candidates
on fundraising expenses, contributions to other candidates, and donations. If incumbent
spending is, as has been found repeatedly in the literature, less effective than challenger
spending, the high level of spending on fundraising seems counter-intuitive. However, can-
didate fundraising is not restricted to their own campaign. Candidates can raise money for
national parties, other federal candidates, and even state and local candidates and parties,
as seen by their increased spending on contributions to other candidates. Incumbents have
several advantages over other candidates in terms of fundraising. Their high visibility of
elected officials may lead to more effective fundraising, as their fundraising windows likely
extends further before the election than other candidates.
The share of campaign expenditures that are contributions to other political entities
(candidates, parties, and committees), is 8 times higher for incumbents than it is for other
candidates. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which fundraising activities are
tied to these eventual transfer of funds from incumbents to other candidates, it is clear
that incumbents are far more likely to commit a significant portion of their expenditures
to activities that do not directly affect their own campaign.
These differences in spending habits between incumbents and challengers has an im-
portant implication to research using FEC expenditure data. While the effectiveness of
total campaign spending may differ between incumbents and challengers, the observed
difference in the makeup of disbursements implies that incumbent disbursements are not
used in the same way. By considering only communications, I am able to make a true
“apples-to-apples” comparison of campaign spending by both incumbents and challengers.
Data on potential voters come from the 2012 American National Election Study Time
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Series Study. This study surveyed potential voters both before and after the November
6 election. Pre-election surveys took place between September 9 and November 5, with
more than half taking place between October 16 and October 20. The full distribution
can been in Figure 3.5. This shows the large share of respondents whose initial preferences
are being measured late in the election cycle. Given the late timing of the pre-election
survey, there are initial concerns that political decisions had already been made, leaving
little variation in the dependent variable. However, almost 20% of respondents change
their stated preferences between the pre and post-election survey.
By taking spending data from the SEC database, I was able to link spending data to
the ANES. This means that I was able to measure the aggregate level of spending up to the
point of the pre-election survey and again up to November 5. As the survey asked about
all elections, each survey participant can appear up to twice in the data: once for her
responses about the House election, and once for the Senate Election. Large differences
in spending exist between spending levels in Congressional and Senate campaigns, and
therefore I estimates causal effects separately for the two houses.
Summary Statistics are shown in Table 3.1. All 33 Senate elections are used in my
sample. Of the 435 Congressional districts, only 359 were used in my sample. This is
because I dropped uncontested elections, or elections where either only one candidate
from a major party was participating, or two candidates from the same major party were
participating in the General election (which makes voter activity impossible to determine
through the ANES). By election day, the average Congressional election candidate had
spent $1.17 million, while the average Senate candidate had spend $10.1. Between the
pre-election survey and election day, House candidates spent about $0.177 million, while
Senate candidates spent $1.96 million. To focus on spending only of ads and events,
House candidates spent $0.438 million by election day ($0.127 million after the pre-election
survey), while Senate candidates spend $6.01 million ($1.27. after the pre-election survey).
This means that about 75% of House spending and 65% of Senate spending in the period
between the pre-election survey and election day was in the form of ads or campaign events,
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which is a significantly larger share of total disbursements that is observed in Figure 3.4.
Individuals are only included in the dataset if they participated in both the pre and
post-election survey5, and therefore, the is the potential for non-response or attrition bias
to affect the makeup of the population in my sample (Peress (2010)). However, individual
characteristics of my sample appear to be mostly representative of both the full ANES
sample, and of eligible voters in general. Individual characteristics appear to be roughly
representative of the voting-age population, with ratios of males and nonwhite similar to
the average reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. While the average age within my sample
is slightly higher than the average age from the U.S. Census Bureau (49 years old), this
could be because both the ANES and Census only report broad age groups, instead of
actual ages, which forces me to impute estimated ages for respondents. Of the 10,044
possible responders of the ANES, only 5,144 can be used for my analysis, as respondents
needed to participate and answer all voting questions in both waves of the survey for me to
be able to measure changes in preferences. Individuals used in my analysis differ slightly
from the full ANES sample. They are more likely to be male, married, white, and slightly
younger, but these differences are not large.
Finally, the net vote variable shows that the average voter will, on election day, cast
net votes of -0.132 for the Republican, relative to the Democrat. Of those who voted for
either the Republican or Democrat, 55% in House elections and 59% in Senate elections
voted for the Democrat. This percentage is larger than that of the general public, and may
be a result of imperfect regional variation in the administration of the ANES, in favor of
urban voters. This preference for Democrats seen in the general election is slightly stronger
than the average preference stated by voters during the pre-election survey, meaning that
the average voter preferences change slightly towards the Democratic candidate during the
campaign.
5I also eliminate from all regressions anyone who had already voted before the pre-election survey, and
anyone who was voting in a different district than they one in which the survey was taking place
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Effects of Relative Spending
First, I consider the effect of all candidate disbursements, regardless of purpose, pooling
elections involving incumbents and open seats. Senate and Congressional elections are esti-
mated and reported separately. The results from these regressions will be most comparable
to previous research on campaign spending. Table 3.2 presents these findings. Column 1
presents the results of the cross-sectional data, using only voters behavior on the day of
voting. Unsurprisingly, a strong, positive correlation is observed between voter preferences
and the spending of candidates. However, spending is endogenous to voter preferences.
Unobserved candidate quality will likely increase both the funds they can raise (and there-
fore spend) and the likelihood than an individual will like, and vote, for them. Other
coefficients are of the expected sign. Males, whites, and married people are more likely to
vote for a Republican. Controlling for other observables, age is uncorrelated with voting
behavior.
Columns 2-4 provide the results for different specifications of the first-difference regres-
sion. As expected, the correlation between spending and voter behavior is significantly
weaker than that seen in Column 1. Previous research has questioned the effectiveness of
campaign spending, and these results seem to support these findings, with the statistical
significance only present when no covariates are used (Column 2).
Point estimates do not depend greatly on model specification, and controlling for time-
invariant observable voter characteristics does not change the results. Using the results
from column 3 , I estimate that a 1 unit increase in the ratio of Republican to Democrat
spending leads to a change of 0.0159 net votes for an individual. In other words, if the
Republican candidate were to increase their spending, relative to the Democrat, by 100
Table 3.3 presents the results from the same framework using this measure that I call
“spending”, which is all disbursements, minus donations, refunds, and contributions. The
results are almost identical to those using all candidate disbursements. This provides
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evidence that, though using candidate disbursement summaries may not be a perfectly
accurate way of measuring spending in support of a candidate, it is unlikely to lead to
a large bias in the estimate of the causal effect of spending for the average candidate.
This is not surprising, as the two measures (disbursement and spending) are very similar.
However, later results will show that the same cannot be said when this framework is used
to address the incumbent-challenger spending puzzle.
Finally, I focus only on types of spending that are most likely to sway the opinion
of voters, by counting a campaign spending classified as advertising or campaign events.
Because the nature of the data being used for this study allows me to measure changes in
voter opinion late in the campaign season, looking at this type of spending is appealing. As
shown in Figure 3.2, late-campaign season spending appears to be particularly concentrated
in communications to voters.
Panel C of Table 3.2 presents these results. Though the point estimates are significantly
smaller, they are more precisely estimated and as a result all are significant at the 5% level.
Additionally, when the scale of the independent variables is taken into account, these finding
represent an increased responsiveness of voters to candidate spending. Using the results
from Column 4, a 1 standard deviation change in the relative spending results in a 0.0334
standard deviation change in the net votes for the candidate (compared to 0.0196 standard
deviations using all spending). These results indicate that campaign spending still appears
to sway the opinion of voters late in an election cycle. Since ads and campaign events
are the types of spending most closely associated with “campaigning”, these results may
be the most accurate measurement of the effect of spending used specifically to influence
the behavior of voters. These findings, taken together, suggest that using the sum of
all candidate disbursements in measuring the causal effect of campaign spending leads to
downwardly biased estimates of the effect of campaign spending.
Importantly, the estimates of causal effect using only communication spending classified
are much more precisely estimated than those using more inclusive measurements. By
focusing only on the most visible forms of campaign spending (and therefore the types
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of spending that are most likely to be used to in close elections), I can reject the null
hypothesis that campaign spending has no effect on candidate success.
The difference between causal effects in the Senate and House of Representatives is
stark. Under each of the first-difference specifications, a one-unit increase the on the log
of relative spending has impact on net votes in House of Representatives elections 3 to 6
times greater than the causal effect of spending in Senate elections. The impact of identical
spending increases is even larger. As shown in Table 3.4, a $500,000 increase in spending on
communications in House elections leads to a 0.0201 change in the net votes for a individual,
representing a 2.01% shift in net votes for a candidate. In the 2012 Congressional elections,
15 of 435 districts were decided by this margin or less.
In Senate elections, the same $500,000 increase would increase net votes by only 0.0013
net votes. This could influence elections decided by 0.13% or less, which is a smaller margin
than any in the 2012 Senate elections. Some have hypothesized (Jacobson (1985)) that
candidate spending exhibits diminishing returns. Under this theory, all candidates may
still have identical production functions, but higher-spending candidates (such as Senate
candidates or incumbents) see smaller marginal returns to their spending due to their
placement on that function. Given the significant spending advantage Senate candidates
have over their House counterparts, the theory of diminishing returns is consistent with
the results found here.
The coefficients of individual characteristics, shown in Panel C of Table 3.3, are all
very close to zero. As these values do not vary across time, a finding of significance with
one of these variables would give reason to question with validity of the first-difference
framework, as it could be caused by a time-variant omitted variable correlated with one of
these variables.
These results indicate that while I cannot reject the null hypothesis that changes in can-
didate spending has no effect on voter behavior when I measure candidate spending using
all disbursements, this result is not robust to restricting candidate spending to spending
that is most likely to be used to deliver messages to voters. Using total candidate spending
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to measure this effect leads to noisier, and potentially biased estimates of causal effect.
The effect of communication spending on voter opinion late in the election cycle is small
but precisely defined. As seen in Figure 3.2, candidates respond to competitiveness by
increasing their spending in communication, and the effectiveness of this spending is of
central importance to understanding political campaigns.
3.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
The notion that campaign spending can have different effect on different types of voters is
certainly a plausible one. Not only do candidates tailor their campaign messages to groups
they believe can be swayed, but theoretical models often rely on assumptions regarding the
receptiveness of voters to candidate signals. Given the rich set of questions asked as part
of the ANES, it is possible to test for heterogeneous treatment effects based on individuals’
policy positions or political commitment.
First, I compare the causal effects across individuals’ self-proclaimed political views.
The ANES asks people to identify themselves on a 1-7 conservative/liberal scale. About
35% of people identify themselves as “Moderate” (4 on the 1 to 7 scale). If campaign
spending operates by changing the identity of the median voter, one might expect moderate
voters to respond more strongly to messages from candidates, as their most preferred
candidate could be harder to identify. To test this hypothesis, I created an indicator
variable equal to 1 if a voter identified themselves as moderate, and 0 otherwise, and
interacted it with the measure of candidate spending.
Table 3.5 shows the results of this regression, and provide little evidence that moderate
voters are more responsive to campaign spending. If moderate voters are more susceptible
to the message of candidates, the interaction term would be positive. For both House and
Senate elections, under each of the first-difference specifications, there is no statistically
significant positive estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term.
Alternatively, I consider if an individual’s responsiveness to candidate spending is a
function of their previous political participation. I consider whether a person participated
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in the Presidential Primary election, creating an indicator variable equal to 1 if a person
voted in the presidential election, and 0 otherwise, and again interacting this variable with
the measure of candidate spending. Presidential elections are held separately from other
primaries, so this is not serving as a proxy for participation in a Congressional primary.
Table 3.6 shows the results from this regression, which indicate that the level of political
participation, not self-declared policy stances, is an important element of the causal effect of
campaign spending. For spending in both houses of Congress, and across all specifications
of the first-difference regression, the negative coefficient attached to the interaction term
indicates that people who had already participated in a caucus or primary election for
President are significantly less likely to be influenced by candidate spending. Participation
in primaries may measure people’s commitment to voting, or may be a more accurate
measure of the moderation of individuals’ policy position than self-identification.
Individuals who vote in primaries are not identical to those who do not; the are older
and more likely to be married. I tested if these different causal effects could be explained
by demographic differences alone by interacting candidate spending with both age and a
dummy variable for marriage; the results (not shown) do not allow me to reject the null
hypothesis that differences in age and marital status do not change the causal effect of
candidate spending. Therefore, the demographic differences between primary voters and
non-voters is not driving the results.
3.4.3 Incumbent and Challenger Spending
Given that the estimate of causal effect of campaign spending differs across different cate-
gories of campaign disbursements, and the observed discrepancy in the habits of incumbent
spending relative to the spending patterns of other candidates, and, there is reason to sus-
pect that different measurements of candidate spending can yield different results of the
relative effect of incumbent and challenger spending. Specifically, incumbents spend sig-
nificantly more then challengers on refunds, political contributions, and donations, and a
much lower portion of their spending on advertising.
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Empirical work, spanning numerous countries, has found smaller observed effects of
incumbent spending. However, incumbents outspend challengers by a significant amount,
and spend a higher share of their spending on fundraising. If candidate spending is as
ineffective as these studies have found, why do incumbents still spend so much effort rais-
ing funds? To ask a more perplexing question, why are individuals and Political Action
Committee’s so willing to give to fund less effective spending?
I consider the effect of incumbent and challenger spending on late-election preferences
of potential voters, and explore how different measures of spending affect the estimate of
causal effect. I change the specification outlined above, regressing individuals preferences
on Incumbent and Challenger spending separately, instead of relative spending. The sample
is restricted to districts in which an Incumbent was facing a Challenger 6
The framework is similar to that used in Levitt (1994). Voter behavior at the time of
election is described by:
NetV otesie = φXi+β1ln(IncumbentSpending)e−β2ln(ChallengerSpending)e+δi+ζe+ie
Here, NetV otesie is equal to +1 if individual i votes for the incumbent, -1 if they vote
for the challenger, and 0 if they vote for neither candidate. As before, omitted variables,
at both the individual and Congressional District level, bias the estimates of causal effects.
In this case, a positive shock to unobserved challenger quality would reduce the number
of votes for the Incumbent, while increased competition would incentivize incumbents to
increase their level of spending. Low-spending incumbents are likely those facing poorer
competition. By taking the pre-election preferences of potential voters, I can difference out
these unobserved variables.
∆NetV otesit = ∆γt+∆β1ln(IncumbentSpending)et−∆β2ln(ChallengerSpending)et+et
6As 2012 was the first election after re-districting, which resulted in several instances of incumbents
facing each other.
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As before, these values are measured using the date of the pre-election survey for time
t. To control for aggregate, time-variant shocks, I again measure the difference between
time t and the election. The minus sign in front of challenger spending reflects that
increased challenger spending is assumed to have a negative impact on the incumbent’s
vote share; this formulation also normalizes coefficients on spending for both challengers
and incumbents to be the same sign.
The cross-section columns (1 & 4) of Table 3.7 show the results on the cross-section
regression, using election-day data only, which shows the common finding that incumbent
spending has no positive effect on votes, while challenger spending appears to increase
challenger vote share. These findings do not change dramatically as I consider different
measurements of candidate spending, and the results appear to in fact get stronger for Sen-
ate elections. These findings are not surprising, though, considering the observed patterns
of unchallenged incumbent spending. While unchallenged incumbents (who will ultimately
earn huge vote shares) continue to spend in total, very little of their spending is in the form
of advertising or campaign events. This would exacerbate the bias stemming from reactive
spending: challenged incumbents (who will earn lower vote shares because they face com-
petition) will spend money on advertising and campaign events; unchallenged incumbents
will not.
Moving to the first-differences specifications, which provide unbiased estimates of causal
effect, panel A shows the results for the regression using all disbursements as the measure of
candidate spending, and is therefore most analogous to previous research. Unsurprisingly,
these results are similar to previous findings: candidate spending seems to have little
measurable effect, and incumbent spending does appear to be less effective than challenger
spending. In fact, these results are so far from statistical significance, and vary so much
across different specifications, that they would provide convincing support of a claim that
campaign spending from any candidate has no effect on voter behavior
However, as I have shown, a great deal of spending is not likely being used to affect
voter behavior, and would therefore be inappropriate to include in measures of candidate
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spending in this setting. Panel B shows the results when donations, refunds, and contri-
butions are dropped from the measure of spending, and provides some idea of the extent
to which including this data biases the measure of causal effect. As with Panel A, the
estimates are not statistically significant, though in each case, the point estimates become
more positive.
Panel C shows the estimate of causal effect when only the most salient forms of cam-
paign spending are used, and the results are dramatically different. Two significant changes
can be observed. First, particularly in the case of House elections, estimates of causal ef-
fect are now positive for both incumbent and challenge spending. For House elections, the
change in the measure of casual effect from Panel A is stark, shifting from mildly nega-
tive to strongly positive. For both houses of Congress, the point estimates of the effect
of incumbent and challenger spending are very similar. Using the preferred specification
(Column 4), controlling for time fixed effects and individual characteristics, shows that a
1 unit increase in the log of incumbent spending leads to a 0.0173 increase in net votes for
House elections, and a 0.0048 increase in Senate elections. A 1 unit increase in the log of
challenger spending increases the net votes for that candidate by 0.0126 in House elections
and 0.068 in Senate election, though the latter estimate is not statistically significant.
Second, points estimates are far more precisely estimated across all specifications. If
advertising and events are the primary mechanisms through which candidates convey their
platforms and send messages to voters, this increased precision is intuitive. I can reject the
null hypothesis that incumbent spending has no effect, at the 5% level for House elections
and 10% level in Senate elections for the preferred specification. Estimates of the effect
of challenger spending are less precise, and are only significant at the 10% level for House
elections, and not statistically significant for Senate elections. These results challenge the
findings of previous research that found incumbent spending to be less effective. The speci-
ficity of the setting (late-election advertising and event spending on late-election changes
in voter behavior) may explain some of the differences7, but nonetheless questions whether
7However, as seen in Figure 3.2, though I am only measuring spending during the general election, this
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previous findings have found incumbent spending to be less effective because of the use of
inclusive measures of spending, instead of the narrower ones used to calculate estimates in
Panel C.
To place these results in context, I compare the effect of identical increases in spend-
ing using estimates obtained by using all spending, and alternatively by measuring only
spending on advertising and campaign events. This comparison will help illustrate both
how use of a broader measure of candidate spending can lead to bias estimates (particu-
larly for incumbents) and allow me to compare the differences in causal effect measured
here to estimates from previous research. As I am measuring the effect of late-campaign
spending, there is strong reason to believe that spending will have a smaller effect due to
the diminishing marginal returns to campaign spending. Candidates had already spent
a great deal of money by the time of the first survey, and many voters may have firmly
established preferences.
Table 3.8 shows this comparison. When the sum of all candidate disbursements is used
as the primary right-hand side variable, the measures of the effect of an identical increase
in incumbent and challenger spending are starkly different, with incumbent spending de-
creasing the net votes for that candidate, while challenger spending results in a positive
change in net votes for that candidate. However, both of these estimates are extremely
small and imprecisely estimated.
When I consider spending only on communications, the difference in causal effect be-
tween incumbent and challenger spending disappears. While both estimates increase, the
estimate of the effect of incumbent spending increases by significantly more, bringing in
line with estimates of the effect of challenger spending. A $100,000 increase in 1998 dollars
(equal to $139,000 in 2012 dollars), leads to a 0.0124 increase in net votes, which would
be the equivalent of 0.62% increase in the vote share of incumbent (with corresponding,
identical decrease in challenger vote share). Likewise, an increase in challenger spending of
time period accounted for two-thirds of total spending on advertising and events by winners of Congressional
elections.
90
$139,000 in 2012 dollars leads to a 0.0119 increase in net votes, or 0.596% increase in chal-
lenger vote share in a 2-candidate race. Though these effects are small, they nonetheless
represent an important shift from estimates using all candidate spending. The estimates
difference between incumbent and challenger spending went from +0.28, which is larger in
absolute value than either point estimate, to only -0.024, implying that incumbent spending
on communications in House elections is actually slightly more effective in this setting. This
raises the question of whether estimates of the relative effect of incumbent and challenger
spending found in previous studies would similarly change when spending is redefined as
it is here.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper offers two primary insights. First, by using pre and post-election survey ques-
tions in the American National Election Study, I am able to track changes in voter pref-
erences for candidates late in the general election, and evaluate how those changes are
predicted by candidate spending. I find that candidate spending has a small but signif-
icant effect, indicating that, even late in a campaign, when voters have been exposed to
large amounts of campaign messages, higher-spending candidates are able to sway voters.
Second, by using transaction-level disbursement data from the Federal Election com-
mission, I am able to calculate the effects of different types of candidate disbursements. I
find that some candidate disbursements comes in the form of contribution refunds, con-
tributions to the national party or other candidates, or donations, and that incumbents
are far more likely to engage in this kind of spending. As this spending is not being used
towards a candidate’s own campaign, it should be eliminated from most measures of true
candidate spending. In order to obtain a precise measure of candidate spending, I use as
my primary measure only spending on advertising and campaign events, and find that es-
timates using this measure provide different results and are more precisely estimated than
estimates using the sum of all candidate disbursements, which is the measure normally used
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in previous research. Additionally, I find that when spending on advertising and campaign
events is used, the common finding of less effective incumbent spending disappears, indi-
cating that previous results finding an decreased effectiveness of incumbent spending may
be the result of differences in spending patterns by incumbents and challengers, instead of
different effectiveness of signals by the two types of candidates.
Empirical findings have a non-trivial implication on policy recommendations. If cam-
paign spending has little effect on vote share, then spending limits could be supported
under an argument of efficiency, but not if the primary use of limits is to prevent can-
didates from “buying” elections. If challenger spending is more effective than incumbent
spending, public support of both candidates could be used if the goal was to discour-
aged unchallenged incumbents. If, however, challenger and incumbent spending is equally
effective, this policy would have no use.
Similarly, campaign spending limits would hurt challengers if spending by challengers
is more effective than spending by incumbents; however, if spending by challengers and
incumbents is equally effective, such limits would likely help challengers, who spend signif-
icantly less and are therefore less likely to be constrained by the limit. This paper provides
important context for research in the relative effectiveness of incumbent and challenger
spending.
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Figure 3.1: Total Spending By Election Competition
Figure 3.2: Ad and Event Spending By Election Competition
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Table 3.2: Effect of Campaign Spending on Voter Behavior: House Elections
PANEL A: Disbursments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Cross-Section FD(I) FD(II) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.309*** 0.0235** 0.0194 0.0159
(0.00264) (0.0101) (0.0250) (0.0494)
R-squared 0.151 0.001 0.022 0.022
PANEL B: Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Spending) 0.311*** 0.0279* 0.0242 0.0212
(0.00273) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0172)
R-squared 0.149 0.000 0.022 0.022
PANEL C: Communications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Spending) 0.269*** 0.0108** 0.0108** 0.0111**
(0.00259) (0.00530) (0.00549) (0.00565)
Male 0.0464 0.0076
(0.0299) (0.0208)
Married 0.215*** 0.0150
(0.0282) (0.0205)
Age 0.000445 0.000301
(0.000882) (0.00066)
Nonwhite -0.493*** -0.137
(0.0386) (0.0254)
R-squared 0.139 0.001 0.022 0.023
Observations 3,465 3,398 3,398 3,373
Time FE NO NO YES YES
Ind. Characteristics YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors cluster at Congressional district level
in parentheses.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 3.3: Effect of Campaign Spending on Voter Behavior: Senate Elections
PANEL A: Disbursements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Cross-Section FD(I) FD(II) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.0546*** 0.0163 0.0126 0.0112
(0.0061) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0494)
R-squared 0.115 0.000 0.025 0.028
PANEL B: Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Spending) 0.0548*** 0.0151 0.0107 0.00947
(0.00617) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0111)
R-squared 0.114 0.000 0.022 0.028
PANEL C: Communications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Spending) 0.0259** 0.00528** 0.00423** 0.00351
(0.0113) (0.00176) (0.00211) (0.00211)
R-squared 0.102 0.001 0.025 0.028
Observations 2,767 2,703 2,703 2,682
Time FE NO NO YES YES
Ind. Characteristics YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors cluster at Congressional district level
in parentheses.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Table 3.4: Effect of $500,000 Increase in Spending
Model FD(I) FD(II) FD(III)
Spending on Advertising and Events
House 1.96% 1.96% 2.01%
Senate 0.19% 0.15% 0.13%
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Table 3.5: Differential Effects of Campaign Spending(I)
PANEL A: House
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FD(I) FD(II) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.00903 0.00907 0.00909
(0.00605) (0.00650) (0.00656)
Moderate*Log(Spending) 0.00536 0.00542 0.00623
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0126)
Observations 3,396 3,396 3,371
R-squared 0.001 0.022 0.023
PANEL B: Senate
Log(Spending) 0.00695** 0.00658*** 0.00643***
(0.00265) (0.00178) (0.00190)
Moderate*Log(Spending) -0.00666 -0.00907 -0.0112*
(0.00627) (0.00584) (0.00621)
Observations 2,703 2,703 2,682
R-squared 0.001 0.026 0.028
Time FE NO YES YES
Ind. Characteristics NO NO YES
Robust standard errors cluster at Congressional district level
in parentheses.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Figure 3.3: Total Spending By Incumbency Status
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Table 3.6: Differential Effects of Campaign Spending(II)
PANEL A: House
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES FD(I) FD(II) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.0189** 0.0194** 0.0201**
(0.00799) (0.00855) (0.00876)
Log(Spending)* -0.0196* -0.0204* -0.0214*
Primary Voter (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0113)
Observations 3,396 3,396 3,371
R-squared 0.002 0.023 0.024
PANEL B: Senate
Log(Spending( 0.0123*** 0.0114*** 0.0104***
(0.00229) (0.00224) (0.00226)
Log(Spending)* -0.0138*** -0.0139*** -0.0131***
Primary Voter (0.00259) (0.00252) (0.00216)
Observations 2,703 2,703 2,682
Time FE NO YES YES
Ind. Characteristics NO NO YES
Robust standard errors cluster at Congressional district level
in parentheses.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Spending
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Table 3.8: Comparison of Impact
Impact of $100,000 Increase in Spending in
House Elections (1998 Dollars)
VARIABLES Incumbent Challenger Difference
Jacobsen (1985) +0.14 +2.17 +2.03
Green & Krasno +1.8 +1.96 +0.16
Levitt +0.07 +0.24 +0.17
Erikson & Pallfrey + 0.57 +1.07 +0.50
SS (Disbursment) -0.22 +0.06 +0.28
SS (Communication) +0.62 +0.594 -0.026
Other estimates taken from Gerber (2004)
Figure 3.5: Timing of Pre-Election ANES Survey
Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 First-Differences Analysis
An alternative specification to the fixed effects analysis described above is a first-differences
analysis. Because our treatment variable (the number of RFD routes) does not vary within
the pre- and post-rollout time periods, we simply take as a measure of our outcome variables
the change in the average between the pre- and post-rollout periods. One concern with
the fixed-effects analysis is that our instruments may be correlated with regions or county
characteristics that will place counties on different trends. However, we cannot control for
these characteristics within the fixed-effects framework, since any variable that does not
change over time would be collinear with the county fixed effects.
The specification for the first-differences analysis is
∆Yc = β∆Routesc + µ∆Xc + ψWc + uc (A.1)
where ∆Yc is the change in the average of each of our outcome variables. We calculate
this by taking the average of each variable within a county over all elections held in 1908
and later, and subtracting from this value the average each variable within a county over
all elections held in 1900 and before. Each of our independent variables is calculated the
same way. ∆Routesc is simply the change in RFD routes between 1900 and 1908. The
key difference in this specification is the set of variables Wc, which remain fixed within
a county. We will use this to control for population density (as measured by the 1890
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measure of people per square mile). This will allow us to control for the possibility of
differences in trends in counties that are correlated with these values, which we were not
able to do in the fixed-effects analysis.
As before, we also perform an IV regression using the same set of instruments as in the
fixed-effects regressions:
(4)∆Routesc = φLawsc + σZc + βXc + ψWc + ec (A.2)
The results of the OLS regression, shown in table A1, show that the results seen in
the fixed-effects analysis is robust to this specification, with the point estimates changing
little from the fixed-effects regression. Again, we see a statistically insignificant negative
coefficient when using voter turnout as our dependent variable, and positive, significant
results for all measures of election competition. The precision of each of these estimates is
less precise, which may be due to the decrease in observations (due to the aggregation).
Results of the IV regressions are presented in Table A2 and Table A3. From these
results, we see that the previous findings for the effect of RFD on the level of competition
within a county remain, and are robust to the choice of instruments. As before, our
point estimates increase when compared to the OLS regressions, supporting the claim of
a downward bias in those estimates. However, this does not hold when turnout is used as
the dependent variable. Regardless of the choice of instrument, we observe a statistically
insignificant negative effect of RFD, with point estimates slightly more negative than in
the OLS estimates.
A.2 Parallel Trends in the Instruments
Given the existence of time fixed-effects in our analysis, the identifying assumption for our
specification is that an instrument for the number of routes be uncorrelated with trends
in our outcome variables; time-related shocks must be identical across treatment groups.
This allows us to select instruments that are correlated with levels of our outcome variables,
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which is typically a violation of the exclusion restriction, provided they are uncorrelated
with trends. Therefore, we can compare pre- and post-treatment trends across different
values of our instrumental variables. Parallel trends are necessary to address primary
concerns with regards to our instruments. If our instruments are valid, time shocks across
different values of our instruments will be identical, so when we graph these values over
time, the trends in our outcome variables across different values of the instrument should
be parallel.
Since one of our instruments (rainfall) is continuous, the most straightforward way of
testing for parallel trends is to divide counties into groups based on their relative value of
this variable. We therefore place each county in one of three groups. We then calculate the
average of each outcome variable in each year for each of the three groups. For spending,
we will simply divide counties by whether they spent positive amounts on roads and bridges
or did not.
Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 show the pre- and post-rollout trends in several of our county-
level outcome variables, across different values of each of our two instruments. Figure A.1
shows annual averages of each of our outcomes for counties that experienced the highest,
middle, and lowest rainfall respectively. For turnout in Congressional elections, as seen in
the upper left panel, we see several time shocks that are not common across all counties;
however, there are no consistently different trends across the three groups. Results for
the other county-level outcome variables are similar. Counties do not experience perfectly
parallel trends, though we see so no divergence in the groups.
The results for county level spending are more convincing. The behavior of counties that
spent positive amounts of money on roads and bridges appears to follow the same trends
as counties that spent nothing, supporting our identifying assumption. Additionally, the
causal effect can also be more easily seen in Figure A.2. Since counties spending positive
amounts on roads receive more treatment, we would expect to see upwards shifts in the
trends of those counties to occur between the pre- and post-rollout periods. Consider the
fifth panel of Figure A.2 before RFD, counties spending nothing on RFD consistently have
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a higher share of the vote going to small parties than counties that spent money on roads.
However, in the post-rollout period, though the trends between the groups are parallel,
counties that spent money on roads (and therefore received more routes) are consistently
voting more frequently for small parties. The trends within both periods are parallel, and
the shift that occurred between the two periods is a visual representation of the causal
effect. Based on the behavior of these pre- and post-rollout trends, we consider 1890
county-level spending the preferred instrument, though we will present results for both, to
aid in the interpretation of results, and as a robustness check for our findings.
104
F
ig
u
re
A
.1
:
T
re
n
d
s:
R
ai
n
fa
ll
V
ar
ia
b
le
105
F
ig
u
re
A
.2
:
T
re
n
d
s:
S
p
en
d
in
gl
V
ar
ia
b
le
106
T
ab
le
A
1:
F
ir
st
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
R
es
u
lt
s
O
L
S
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
C
on
g
re
ss
io
n
a
l
>
5
P
er
ce
n
t
>
1
0
P
er
ce
n
t
>
2
0
P
er
ce
n
t
S
m
a
ll
P
a
rt
y
T
u
rn
o
u
t
S
h
a
re
R
ou
te
s
-0
.0
7
4
3
0
.0
0
8
8
9
*
*
0
.0
1
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
8
7
*
**
0
.0
8
3
7
*
(0
.1
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
7
9
)
%
U
rb
an
-0
.2
5
7
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
3
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
6
7
*
-0
.0
0
5
1
1
-0
.0
9
8
3
(0
.1
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
6
)
(0
.0
7
0
3
)
%
U
rb
.
S
q
.
0
.0
0
2
1
3
0
.0
0
0
2
6
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
1
7
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
1
1
4
*
*
0
.0
0
3
8
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
9
6
)
(7
.6
1
e-
0
5
)
(5
.2
9
e-
0
5
)
(4
.6
4
e-
0
5)
(0
.0
0
1
0
9
)
%
Im
p
.
F
ar
m
la
n
d
0
.0
0
1
9
4
-0
.0
0
8
2
3
*
-0
.0
0
7
5
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
5
9
0
**
-0
.1
9
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
9
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
1
)
(0
.0
6
7
8
)
%
N
on
w
h
it
e
-0
.3
3
1
0
.0
1
4
5
0
.0
1
1
3
0
.0
0
8
8
7
-0
.0
4
9
8
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
1
4
)
(0
.1
1
3
)
%
F
or
ei
gn
-0
.4
9
3
-0
.0
0
9
4
0
-0
.0
1
3
6
-0
.0
1
2
8
*
-0
.0
9
7
1
(0
.3
0
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
4
)
(0
.2
2
2
)
L
n
(p
op
u
la
ti
on
0
.5
9
0
0
.2
2
2
*
*
*
0
.1
5
7
*
*
0
.1
1
9
1
.6
3
2
(3
.4
6
3
)
(0
.0
7
5
2
)
(0
.0
7
1
6
)
(0
.0
7
1
9
)
(1
.0
5
8
)
D
en
si
ty
(1
89
0)
-0
.0
0
0
1
4
5
4
.2
3
e-
0
5
*
*
*
4
.2
3
e-
0
5
*
*
*
1
.4
0
e-
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
0
5
5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
3
7
0
)
(7
.4
7
e-
0
6
)
(7
.4
6
e-
0
6
)
(6
.2
2
e-
0
6)
(0
.0
0
0
1
9
3
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
2
,4
1
4
2
,4
1
4
2
,4
1
4
2
,4
1
4
2
,4
1
4
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
0
.0
2
9
0
.1
9
4
0
.1
8
1
0
.1
3
0
0
.1
0
6
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
,
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
C
o
n
g
re
ss
io
n
a
l
d
is
tr
ic
t
le
ve
l
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
107
Table A2: IV Regerssion with First Differences
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Turnout Turnout
Routes -0.369 -0.224
(0.324) (0.505)
% Urban -0.197** -0.215*
(0.0997) (0.121)
% Urb. Sq 0.00453* 0.00349
(0.00241) (0.00348)
% Imp. Farmland -0.00437 0.0156
(0.124) (0.107)
% Nonwhite -0.128 -0.126
(0.320) (0.266)
% Foreign -0.669*** -0.612***
(0.233) (0.212)
Ln(Population) -2.859 0.206
(5.775) (5.279)
Density -0.000177 -0.000107
(0.000390) (0.000444)
Observations 2,549 2,633
R-squared 0.012
Instrument Rainfall Spending
Standard errors, clustered at Cong. District level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B
Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Robustness checks
This section presents the results of several robustness checks of the primary findings of
the differences-and-differences model outlines above. First, I run two placebo tests, using
different years as dates of policy change. I regress the effect of runoff elections on vote
share using just elections held before 2001, with a placebo law change between the 1994
& 1996 elections. I then repeat this procedure with post-2000 elections, with a placebo
law change in Florida between the 2004 and 2006 elections. Since no actual law change
occurred at these points, a statistically significant result would give reason to question the
validity of the model’s assumptions.
Table A1 presents the results from these two placebo tests. Neither test gives statisti-
cally significant results, and are of opposite signs. These results indicate that the estimates
of causal effect are not simply the result of secular trends that are not being accounted for
in the primary model.
Several recent papers have addressed the issue of the potential for biased standard
errors in differences-in-differences analysis, each with a proposed remedy. Bertrand et al.
(2004) recommend several potential mechanisms, although the only recommendation when
there are a small number of groups (as in this case) is to collapse all data into pre- and post-
treatment periods, and the low predictive power of this method may be overly conservative.
For this setting, I collapse the data into pre-treatment and post-treatment averages for
each of the six types of offices (Governor, Cabinet, State House and Senate, United States
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House and Senate). I do this because the average of the outcome variable differs across
office types, and changes between the pre- and post-treatment averages could be driven
by changes in composition. I calculate the average for the cumulative vote share for all
candidates finishing third or lower, the percentage of elections that are Republican, the
percentage of election that involve incumbents, and the average number of candidates, and
run the following regression.
V oteSharesp = γs + postp + µ ∗Xsp + β ∗Runoffsp + εist
Where V oteSharesp is the average vote share for low-performing candidates for each
body of government in state s in period p. Xsp is the average for the set of co-variates
listed above. Column 1 of Table A2 shows the results of this procedure. The point estimate
of this regression is larger to that found in the primary regression, but as expected the
standard errors are significantly larger, and eliminate any statistical significance. Though
these standard deviations are large, they also highlight the small measured effect of runoff
elections on voting behavior. While the standard errors are large compared to the primary
model, they are not so large that they would have prevented me from rejecting the null
hypothesis of no effect is the point estimates were comparable to those found in other
settings (50% of the baseline).
I find similar results when I use the procedure outlined by Donald and Lang (2004),
who propose a two-step process for calculating standard errors and t-statistics. The results
for this procedure (not shown) were similar; large standard errors eliminate any statistical
significance of the estimates of causal effect.
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Table A1: Dependent Variable: Vote Share
Placebo Tests for of Causal Effect
(1) (2)
1990-2000 2002-2010
Runoff 1.310 -1.179
(1.617) (1.732)
Num. of Candidates 6.809∗∗∗ 5.210***
(0.340) (0.269)
Republican 0.0294 0.098
(0.725) (0.736)
Incumbent Involvement -3.104*** -5.814***
(0.972) 0.879
N 577 760
R2 0.450 0.401
Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. State Level
Controls include dummies indicating no-excuse absentee voting and provisional ballot laws
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2: Dependent Variable: Vote Share
(1)
Betrand et al.
Runoff
(2.895)
Num. of Candidates 3.20∗∗∗
(0.671)
Republican 0.721
(3.023)
Incumbent Involvement -2.452
(3.625)
Post-2001 5.178*
N 75
R2 0.387
Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. State Level
Controls include dummies indicating no-excuse absentee voting and provisional ballot laws
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix C
Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Robustness Checks
To address the issue of individuals exhibiting a bias towards one of the candidates, or
toward the incumbent, the ANES has employed several measures to elicit honest answers.
First, researchers recognized that when the survey asked people a series of questions about
their opinion of the incumbent at the beginning of the survey, they were more likely to
claim to having voted for the incumbent. To address this, the Study moved when the
questions about incumbents were asked, and questions about who the individual voted for
lacked any incumbent or challenger notation. Survey-takers were presented with a ballot
card which featured either the name of the candidates, or a list of political parties.
To discourage voters from claiming that they voted when they did not, the survey
added a supplemental set of answer options, providing voters with opportunities to explain
why they did not vote (e.g. “I usually vote, but didn’t this time”). This increased the
percentage of respondents who claimed to have not voted to closer to the national average.
If people who over-report voting are more likely to claim to have voter for the candi-
date who engaged on more advertising of campaign events, over-reporting of voting could
lead to an upward bias of my estimate of causal effect. To test if voter’s over-reporting of
voting could lead to systemically different estimates of causal effect, I tested the primary
hypothesis using only data from people who had completed the survey online. Research
has shown that self-administered surveys are less susceptible to over-reporting bias (Hol-
brook and Krosnick (2010)). If survey respondents were more likely to claim they voted
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due to social pressures, online respondents would be more likely to answer honestly than
respondents in face-to-face surveys. Table A1 compares the effect of spending on adver-
tising and events separately for respondents taking a face-to-face (FTF) or online survey
survey. There appears to be no systematic difference between the effect of spending on the
two samples. While face-to-face respondents appeared to be slightly less affected than on-
line respondents by spending in House of Representative elections, whey were slight more
affected by Senate spending. These results offer little evidence that the causal effect of
spending is being driven by face-to-face respondents, who may be more likely to claim
having voted even when they did not.
To test for the existence of bias towards the winner in post-election survey, I test
whether the identity of the winner predicts a change in an invidual’s stated preferce. I
constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 if a Republican won a seat, and 0 if a Democrat
won. I then regressed the change in net votes on candidate spending, indivdual charac-
terics, and dummy variable. The results for this regression are presented in Table A2. If
respondents are more likely to claim to have voted for a candidate because that candidate
won, there should be a positive correlation between the dummy variable for Republican
win and the change in the net votes for Republican.
C.2 Assignment of Spending Type
To assign spending to the correct codes, I used the following procedure. First, I assigned
codes to observations where the attached note was identical to one of the 12 codes (i.e.
“Donation”, “Advertisement”). Next, I determined, for all identical notes, the most fre-
quent disbursement code to which it was assigned. Through this, I was able to assign codes
for 633,879 (87.7%) of contributions, constituting $1.687 Bill (85.03%) of contributions. Of
the remaining transactions, the majority failed to be assigned due to a lack of standard-
ization or misspelling in the description field. Assignment was done manually using each
individual disbursement description.
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Table A1: Causal Effect by Survey Method
PANEL A: House
FTF Online
VARIABLES FD(III) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.00562 0.0133**
(0.0104) (0.00658)
Observations 916 2,455
R-squared 0.0067 0.0088
PANEL B: Senate
FTF Online
VARIABLES FD(III) FD(III)
Log(Spending) 0.00662 0.000921
(0.00463) (0.00367)
Observations 702 1,980
R-squared 0.076 0.0074
Time FE YES YES
Ind. Characteristics YES YES
Robust standard errors cluster at Congressional district level
in parentheses.
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1
Table A2: Test for Winner Bias
(House) (Senate) )
VARIABLES FD (III) FD (III)
Republican Win (=1) 0.0304 0.0444
(0.0200) (0.0268)
Male 0.00843 -0.0251
(0.0209) (0.0247)
Married 0.0117 -0.0232
(0.0207) (0.0229)
Age 0.000365 -0.0000195
(0.000661) (0.000833)
Nonwhite -0.0100 -0.0384
(0.0263) (0.0174
Spending 0.0112* 0.00175
(0.00567) (0.0028)
Observations 3,337 2,683
R-squared 0.022 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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